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PERFORMANCE-SENSITIVE DEBT:
FROM ASSET-BASED LOANS TO STARTUP
FINANCING
Houman B. Shadab*
This Article develops a unique theory of performance-sensitive debt
and argues that certain revenue-stage startups may be missing out on an
important source of capital from asset-based loans. Debt contracts are
performance sensitive to the extent any of the borrower’s obligations adjust
in response to the performance of the borrower. The three main types of
performance sensitivity I identify are (1) a loan’s interest rate adjusting
based on the performance of the borrower; (2) the amount of available
credit adjusting based on the value of collateral; and (3) renegotiation
following breach of a loan covenant. Conceptualizing performance
sensitivity as a separate governance mechanism allows me to flesh out, and
in some cases challenge, several distinct bodies of research, including
incomplete contracting theory and the literature on capital structure.
The focus of this Article is on the nature of one type of performancesensitive debt in particular—asset-based loans. Asset-based loans are
important because they are the only type of loan that adjusts the amount of
credit available to a borrower based on the performance of its assets. Due
to the protections asset-based loans provide to lenders, they are often the
only type of loan lenders are willing to make to high-risk borrowers. Assetbased loans are often cheaper than other sources of capital, more borrowerfriendly than other types of debt, and can be structured to meet the needs of
a wide variety of borrowers. Because of these characteristics, I argue that
certain revenue-stage startups, including those with intellectual property
assets, may be better off raising capital with asset-based loans than other
types of financing.
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INTRODUCTION
Investments are often followed by regret. As a result, over time
investors have developed contract mechanisms that make it possible for
investment terms to change in their favor in response to bad news. An
important aspect of financial contracting is the extent to which it allows for
the terms of an investment relationship to change in response to the
performance of the company that raised the funds (the issuer). The phrase
performance sensitivity refers to this general characteristic. Performance
sensitivity means that as an issuer’s risk increases, the issuer-investor
relationship adjusts to mitigate (or eliminate) the investor’s corresponding
increase in risk exposure. 1
This Article develops a unique theory of performance-sensitive debt
and argues that certain revenue-stage startups with qualifying assets may be
missing out on an important source of capital from one type of
performance-sensitive debt in particular; namely, asset-based loans. A
long-standing and pervasive economic problem is providing capital to
young companies, 2 and maximizing the use of asset-based loans can help
address that problem. 3
Financial instruments exist along a spectrum of performance
sensitivity. At one extreme is equity, a financial instrument that has no
performance sensitivity: the terms of a shareholder’s investment do not
adjust in response to the issuer’s performance. 4 Debt, by contrast, has

1. As a corollary, performance sensitivity also means that if an issuer’s performance
increases after the investment, the investor’s exposure to the company increases to reflect
the newly improved investment.
2. See generally NAT’L SMALL BUS. ASS’N, SMALL BUSINESS ACCESS TO CAPITAL
SURVEY 1, 6 (2012) (finding based on survey evidence that “nearly half (43 percent) of
small-business respondents said that, in the last four years, they needed funds and were
unable to find any willing sources, be it loans, credit cards or investors”); Survey on the
Access to Finance of SMEs in the Euro Area (European Central Bank, Frankfurt, Ger.),
Nov. 2013, at 1 (finding that “access to finance” is a primary concern of euro area small and
medium sized businesses). But see ALICIA ROBB & JOSEPH FARHAT, KAUFFMAN FOUND., AN
OVERVIEW OF THE KAUFFMAN FIRM SURVEY, RESULTS FROM 2011 BUSINESS ACTIVITIES 1, 5
tbl.1 (2013) (finding that in 2011 only 5.9% of new business reported concerns with access
to or the cost of credit).
3. Other relatively new or developing credit technologies that may also assist new
business in raising funds are microloans and peer-to-peer (crowdfunded) lending.
4. An indirect, second-order type of performance sensitivity exists when the investor
has the option of changing the issuer-investor relationship based on the performance of the
issuer. When equity does have performance-sensitive features, they are second-order and
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varying degrees of performance sensitivity. For debt, performance
sensitivity means that as a borrower’s performance declines, the loan’s
interest rate or other aspect of the loan changes to mitigate the lender’s risk.
One way for debt to be performance sensitive is through the use of a
“borrowing base” provision that reduces the amount of credit available as
the borrower’s asset values decline. A second performance sensitive debt
feature is a “performance pricing” provision that increases the borrower’s
interest rate as its creditworthiness decreases.5 Renegotiating (amending) a
loan prior to maturity is also an important type of performance sensitivity
because interest rates, principal amount, and other aspects of the loan can
be altered in favor of the lender to protect against a deteriorating borrower.
Renegotiation typically takes place after a borrower breaches a loan
covenant.
Figure 1 illustrates the performance sensitivity of several broad classes
of
commercial
finance
instruments
along
a
spectrum:

Figure 1

Common
stock

Bonds

Least Performance Sensitive

Convertible
Secured
preferred stock loans

Assetbased
loans

Most Performance Sensitive

Far from being an idiosyncratic feature of the financial world,
performance sensitive relationships are widespread.
For example,
purchasing stock with borrowed funds (i.e., “on margin”) and derivatives
transactions are performance sensitive. They each require debtors to add
more collateral if their position begins to decrease in market value. By so
doing, the risk to the creditor adjusts in response to the risk of the

include, for example, conversion rights that can be exercised in the discretion of the
shareholder in response to how the company is performing. Second-order performance
sensitivity in the debt context include financial (or maintenance) covenants that give the
lender the right to demand immediate payment of the loan (or other rights) if the borrower
fails to live up to certain minimum performance tests (such as the ratio of debt to equity).
5. Another type of performance sensitive debt feature that is not the focus of this
article is a springing lien/collateral release that requires the borrower to post or release
collateral if their performance (as measured by creditworthiness) decreases.
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borrower. Corporate and government bonds, by contrast, are not generally
performance sensitive. No matter what happens to a bond issuer, the terms
of the bond’s underlying agreement do not change. 6 Bondholders are also
too numerous and dispersed to make a bond renegotiation a generally
worthwhile undertaking.
In the past two decades, corporate loans have become more
performance sensitive through performance pricing provisions that adjust
their interest rates in response to the borrower’s creditworthiness.7 The
increasing use of performance-sensitive loans is not an isolated
phenomenon, however. It is part of a broader, decades-long trend
throughout credit markets giving lenders added protection against the risks
they face from borrowers. The past two decades have seen an explosion in
the development of transactions and markets that enable lenders to protect
themselves by selling off their loans or transferring the loans’ credit risk to
others. These markets and risk transfer transactions include the secondary
market for corporate loans, 8 securitizations that bundle loans into shell
entities that issue bonds, 9 and over-the-counter derivatives that allow
parties to transfer the risk of a wide variety of underlying credit
instruments. 10
In systematically analyzing performance sensitive debt, this Article
adds to our understanding of creditor governance 11 and corporate finance. I
argue that performance sensitivity is a type of fundamental creditor
governance mechanism like monitoring, collateralization, and using
covenants. By contrast, performance sensitivity is typically viewed as an
ad hoc contract feature that protects creditors,12 but not as something
6. A notable exception is “step-up” bonds that have interest rates that increase if the
borrower is downgraded. Bonds’ general lack of performance sensitivity largely explains
why their investors are so dependent on bonds markets to be able to adjust their risk
exposures.
7. See infra Section II.3.i.
8. See generally GLENN YAGO & DONALD MCCARTHY, THE MILIKEN INSTITUTE, THE
U.S. LEVERAGED LOAN MARKET: A PRIMER (2004) (discussing “the origins and milestones
of the quiet revolution that has been the growth of the [primary and secondary] syndicated
loan market . . . one of the most rapidly growing and innovating sections of the U.S. capital
market in the past 20 years”), http://milkeninstitute.org/pdf/loan_primer_1004.pdf.
9. Houman B. Shadab, Credit Risk Transfer Governance: The Good, The Bad, and
the Savvy, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 1009, 1046-64 (2012) [hereinafter Shadab].
10. Id. at 1033-46.
11. See generally Charles K. Whitehead, Creditors and Debt Governance, in
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE LAW (Claire Hill & Brett
McDonnell, eds. 2011); Greg Nini, David C. Smith & Amir Sufi, Creditor Control Rights,
Corporate Governance, and Firm Value, 25 Rev. Fin. Stud. 1713 (2012) [hereinafter Nini et
al.]; Frederick Tung, Leverage in the Board Room: The Unsung Influence of Private
Lenders in Corporate Governance, 57 UCLA L. REV. 115 (2009) [hereinafter Tung].
12. See, e.g., Tung, supra note 11, at 147-150 (focusing on the influence of
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fundamental.
Conceptualizing performance sensitivity as a unique
governance mechanism allows me to flesh out, and in some cases
challenge, several distinct bodies of research.
First, this Article is the first to identify performance-sensitivity as a
type of contractual completeness. Based on that insight, I argue that
incomplete contracting theory suggests that performance-sensitive
contracts are generally more efficient when agency or transaction costs are
high. Second, literature on the economics of loan renegotiation implies that
performance sensitivity in the form of renegotiation after breach of loan
covenants is mutually beneficial characteristic or activity, and not one that
generally benefits only borrowers or lenders. Finally, by focusing on
performance sensitivity, this Article contributes to capital structure
research. I argue that performance sensitivity is an important tradeoff
between debt and equity that should be recognized by the tradeoff theory of
capital structure. In addition, in contrast to what pecking order theory
suggests, I argue that, due to the potential constraints that performancesensitive debt places on borrowers, greater informational asymmetries do
not always imply that a firm should prefer equity over debt.
This Article focuses on asset-based loans — a type of performancesensitive debt. Although asset-based loans are relatively unknown to
practitioners and have received little attention by academics,13 they are
important because they are the only type of loan where the amount of credit
available to the borrower adjusts based on the value of its assets. In this
way, asset-based loans are performance sensitive. 14 But unlike loans that
only have a performance pricing feature that adjusts to the performance of
the borrower at the entity-level (e.g., as measured by credit ratings), assetbased loans adjust to the performance of the borrower’s assets—their
ability to generate cash. Although asset-based loans are a type of secured
(collateralized) loan,15 secured loans typically do not change in size based
on asset performance. Unlike an asset-based lender, a typical secured
lender looks primarily to the company’s cash flows for repayment, not its

performance sensitive provisions on managerial incentives and decision-making).
13. To date, there is no legal scholarship on asset-based loans and few academic
finance papers focused on them. See, e.g., Mark J. Flannery & Xiaohong (Sara) Wang,
Borrowing Base Revolvers: Liquidity for Risky Firms, (Working Paper, ,2011), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1741306); Yasin Alan & Vishal Gaur, Operational Investment and
Capital Structure Under Asset Based Lending, (Johnson School Research Paper Series,
Working Paper, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1716925.
14. To my knowledge this Article is the first publication to identify asset-based loans
as a type of performance-sensitive debt in addition to loans with performance pricing
provisions.
15. HOUMAN B. SHADAB, Hedge Fund Asset-Based Lending, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF ENTREPRENEURIAL FINANCE 613 (2010).
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assets.
Consistent with what creditor governance and corporate finance
theory suggest, asset-based loans are also important because they are often
the only type of loan lenders are willing to provide to risky borrowers.16
Lenders find asset-based loans attractive because the loans have strong
governance in the form of intense monitoring, collateralization, and
performance sensitivity. And due to the protection from these governance
devices, asset-based lenders are also willing to accept lower interest rates
and weaker covenants such that risky firms like startups are more likely to
qualify for the loans. Given that the availability of startup financing
promotes job creation, 17 this Article’s focus on asset-based loans also has
important economy—wide implications because my analysis suggests that
companies are not fully taking advantage of asset-based lending. Although
borrowers run the risk of exposing themselves to unique forms of
opportunism from asset-based lenders, on balance it seems that certain
startups would be better off raising capital with an asset-based loan rather
than by selling stock or using some other kind of loan. The types of
startups most likely to benefit from asset-based loans are revenue-stage
startups with qualifying assets that are seeking financing for growth or
working capital.
For most of their history, asset-based loans belonged to an obscure
corner of the loan market and were used mainly by companies viewed as
being poorly run or in financial distress. But that all changed in the twentyfirst century. Asset-based loans began to overcome the stigma of being
used solely by desperate borrowers and aggressive lenders, and technology
substantially decreased lenders’ monitoring costs. In addition, the assetbased loan market grew due to the incorporation of second lien loans and
other innovations in deal structures, the growing involvement of hedge
16. Allen N. Berger & Gregory F. Udell, Small Business Debt Finance, in HANDBOOK
ENTREPRENEURSHIP RESEARCH: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY SURVEY AND INTRODUCTION 313
(Audretsch & Acs eds. 2003) [hereinafter Berger & Udell] (“[A]sset-based lending is
particularly valuable as a lending technology for high-risk, informationally opaque firms
where the probability of suboptimal closure is higher”); Slee, infra note 146, at 315
(“Thousands of companies that would otherwise not qualify for traditional bank lending
receive asset-based loans each year.”); Tracy Eden, Asset-Based Lenders Serve a True Need
in Today’s Marketplace, Yahoo! Voices, Aug. 20, 2010, available at
http://voices.yahoo.com/asset-based-lenders-serve-true-todays-marketplace-6615468.html
[hereinafter Eden] (“Asset-based lending is often temporary, providing much-needed
working capital during a start-up or transition phase until the company has enough financial
history or a strong enough balance sheet to become ‘bankable.’”).
17. See generally TIM KANE, KAUFFMAN FOUND., THE IMPORTANCE OF STARTUPS IN
JOB
CREATION
AND
JOB
DESTRUCTION
(2010),
http://www.kauffman.org/~/media/Kauffman_org/research%20reports%20and%20covers/2
010/07/firm_formation_importance_of_startups.pdf.
OF
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funds as lenders, and traditional banks’ pullback on lending during and
after the financial crisis of 2007-2008. 18 Major asset-based lenders now
include divisions of large banks such as Wells Fargo and Bank of America,
commercial finance companies GE Capital and CIT Group, and hedge
funds D.E. Shaw Group and Oaktree Capital Management.
By the end of 2012, the amount of asset-based loans outstanding was
at an all-time high of $620 billion—double that of a decade earlier. 19 The
growth of asset-based loans coincides with the growth of securitization and
similar transactions that focus on financing assets isolated from
enterprises. 20 Importantly, these other asset-centric transactions have
expanded the supply of credit in the economy 21 because creditors more
efficiently focus on the narrower range of risk associated with specific
assets, as opposed to the risk of the company as whole that owns the assets.
Asset-based loans nonetheless remain a small portion of the broader
commercial loan market, 22 and therefore have plenty of room to expand.
Asset-based loans are often cheaper than other sources of capital and more
borrower-friendly than other types of debt because lenders spend more
resources screening and analyzing borrowers before making the loan. 23 In
addition, asset-based loans can be structured to meet the needs of a wide
variety of borrowers. The loans are thus also able to meet the needs of
startups, including those with intellectual property assets.24 Startups are
18. See infra Section IV.B.
19. Ianthe J. Dugan, As Banks Retreat, Hedge Funds Smell Profit, WSJ.COM, July 22,
2013,
available
at
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887324637504578567383459564510
[hereinafter Dugan].
20. JOSEPH C. HU, ASSET SECURITIZATION: THEORY AND PRACTICE 11-16 (2011).
21. See FATEN SABRY & CHUDOZIE OKONGWU, NERA ECON. CONSULTING, STUDY OF
THE IMPACT OF SECURITIZATION ON CONSUMERS, INVESTORS, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND
THE
CAPITAL
MARKETS
8-11,
(2009),
http://www.americansecuritization.com/uploadedfiles/ASF_NERA_Report.PDF (discussing
the impact of securitization on the availability of credit).
22. In 2011, U.S. asset-based loan issuance totaled $101 billion compared to $1.9
trillion for the broader commercial syndicated loan market of which it is a part. See Maria
C. Dikeos, Asset-Based Lending Hits Record High in 2011, Expectations of Normalized
Issuance Levels in 2012, ABF J. (March 2012), http://www.abfjournal.com/articles/assetbased-lending-hits-record-high-in-2011-expectations-of-normalized-issuance-levels-in2012; Thompson Reuters, Global Syndicated Loans Review, (2011) at 1,
http://dmi.thomsonreuters.com/Content/Files/4Q11_Global_Loans_Review.pdf.
23. Brendan Swift, Assets a New Base for Mid-market Lending, BUS. REV. WEEKLY,
Nov. 14, 2013 (“‘Whereas [non-asset-based lender] banks . . . will do less work at the front
end around the value of the assets but will have a more strict covenant regime because they
haven’t done the work at the front end.’”).
24. For a broader analysis of the relationship between corporate governance structures
and innovation, see Houman B. Shadab, Innovation and Corporate Governance: The Impact
of Sarbanes-Oxley, 10 U. PA. J. BUS. EMPLOYMENT L. 955, 970-981 (2008).
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likely not taking full advantge of asset-based loans due to their lack of
awareness of the loans and the stigma traditionally associated with them. 25
This Article proceeds as follows. Section I develops my theory of
performance-sensitive debt.
My theory explains how performance
sensitivity is a type of creditor governance mechanism and what structures
and practices make up, or are related to, performance sensitivity. It also
distinguishes between ex post performance sensitivity that takes place after
a loan is executed and ex ante performance sensitivity that is established
upfront by contract. Ex post performance sensitivity results from
renegotiating loans after covenant breaches. Ex ante performance
sensitivity comes from performance pricing and borrowing base provisions.
Section II considers the implications of performance sensitivity for the
literatures on incomplete contracting, the efficiency of loan renegotiation,
and capital structure. Section III examines a uniquely performancesensitive instrument in the form of asset-based loans. The loans reflect the
theoretical aspects of performance sensitivity because in practice they are
often more efficient for high-risk borrowers. Section IV argues that assetbased loans are uniquely suited to provide financing to certain high-risk
startups.
Overall, two basic themes in law and finance underlie this Article’s
investigation of asset-based loans. The first is that riskier borrowers are
subject to more stringent creditor governance devices to compensate the
lender for the heightened risk. The second is that creditor governance
mechanisms are substitutes for one another with respect to protecting
creditors — the more one mechanism is used the less another type needs to
be.
I. A THEORY OF PERFORMANCE-SENSITIVE DEBT
This Section develops my theory of performance-sensitive debt. I first
explain the nature of performance-sensitivity as a type of creditor
governance mechanism. I then explain the different types of performance
sensitivity, which include renegotiation, performance pricing, and
25. Roundtable on SME Finance and Business Growth GROWTH BUSINESS (Aug. 7,
2013),
http://www.growthbusiness.co.uk/growing-a-business/businessfinance/2389203/roundtable-on-sme-finance-and-business-growth.thtml. Asset-based loans
have also more recently become used by large public companies. Randy Schwimmer, The
Rebirth
of
Asset-Based
Lending,
CNN,
June
1,
2011,
http://finance.fortune.cnn.com/2011/06/01/the-rebirth-of-asset-based-lending/ [hereinafter
Schwimmer] (“While ABL is known as ‘lender of last resort’ for tougher credits, the current
cycle has brought corporate heavyweights to the table like Georgia Gulf, Hertz, and Del
Monte, as well as retailers like Sears, Neiman Marcus, Jo-Ann Stores, J Crew, and Liz
Claiborne.”).
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collateralization, as well as related mechanisms or structures such as
monitoring and lines of credit.
A. Creditor Governance and Performance Sensitivity
Credit risk is the primary concern of creditors and explains much of
the features of credit agreements and the interactions between borrowers
and lenders. 26 Credit risk is a governance concern, in addition to an
economic problem, because of the presence of asymmetric information and
potentially misaligned incentives in a creditor-debtor relationship. 27
Asymmetric information and misaligned incentives give rise to agency
costs between creditors (as principals) and debtors (as agents) in the form
of adverse selection, moral hazard, and other types of debtor opportunism
that impose losses and inefficiencies on creditors. 28 Particular agency costs
include debtors increasing their overall risk after credit is extended (asset
substitution) and taking on additional debt obligations that reduce their
ability to repay existing creditors (claim dilution).29 To reduce or eliminate

26. Creditors may also be concerned about the market value of their investment in
secondary markets, which, in addition to credit risk, is primarily determined by market
interest rates.
27. See generally Charles K. Whitehead, Creditors and Debt Governance, in
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE LAW (Claire Hill & Brett
McDonnell, eds. 2012) [Whitehead, Debt Governance] (examining debt’s traditional role in
lending and subsequent changes to this role).
28. Adverse selection takes place when informational asymmetries increase the
propensity of low quality borrowers to obtain credit because lenders are unable to
distinguish between low and high quality borrowers and thereby charge an interest rate that
is too high. See generally George Akerlof, The Market for Lemons: Quality Uncertainty
and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q. J. ECON. 488 (1970) (examining the relationship between
quality of goods and uncertainty). Moral hazard occurs when a lender’s lack of knowledge
over a borrower’s credit risk permits the borrower to engage in opportunistic behavior that
benefits itself at the expense of the lender after the borrower obtains credit. See generally
Masako N. Darrough & Neal M. Stoughton, Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection: The
Question of Financial Structure, 41 J. FIN. 501 (1986) (examining moral hazard and adverse
selection problems).
29. See Elazar Berkovitch & E. Han Kim, Financial Contracting and Leverage
Induced Over- and Under-Investment Incentives, 45 J. FIN. 765, 766 (1990) (explaining
potential problems related to seniority claims and discussing what an optimal seniority rule
would look like); Clifford W. Smith, Jr. & Jerold B. Warner, On Financial Contracting, 7 J.
FIN. ECON. 117, 118-19 (1979) [hereinafter Smith & Warner] (discussing potential sources
of conflict between bondholders and stockholders). For a review of the agency costs of
debt, see generally William W. Bratton, Bond Covenants and Creditor Protection:
Economics and Law, Theory and Practice, Substance and Process, in THE LAW AND
ECONOMICS OF CREDITOR PROTECTION: A TRANSATLANTIC PERSPECTIVE 43-47 (Horst
Eidenmüller & Wolfgang Schön eds., 2008) (examining financial contracts in the United
States and their benefits and drawbacks).
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these agency costs of debt, creditors adopt creditor governance
mechanisms.
The most basic type of creditor governance mechanism is demanding
a specific rate of interest to discipline a debtor and compensate creditors for
the risks associated with the agency costs of debt. Attempting to mitigate
agency costs through interest rates is typically not sufficient, however, due
to informational asymmetries and economic uncertainty that prevent
interest payments alone to properly compensate the creditor for risk.
Creditors accordingly adopt several other governance mechanisms to deal
with credit risk.
A ubiquitous and fundamental governance device is monitoring the
financial condition of the borrower and its compliance with the terms of a
credit agreement.30 Monitoring also includes screening potential borrowers
before credit is extended to them. Another governance mechanism is
requiring the borrower to make certain promises to the lender in the form of
contractual covenants.31 Debt covenants place significant constraints on
debtors including on their ability to take on additional debt, use cash flows,
and make investment decisions.32 Covenants also place performance
requirements on borrowers. 33 Securing a loan with collateral is a
governance mechanism because it can help to reduce the losses upon a
default and also because the very ability to use (certain types of) collateral
may signal quality or allow creditors to screen borrowers.34 Credit risk
transfer is a governance mechanism because selling a credit instrument or
transferring its risk to another party by contract allows lenders to exert
indirect control over debtors, who may be concerned about their debt being
priced lower when it is sold. Credit risk transfer is also a governance
device because the secondary market price discovery of credit risk may

30. See XAVIER FREIXAS & JEAN-CHARLES ROCHET, THE MICROECONOMICS OF
BANKING 29 (2d. ed. 2008) (discussing studies pertaining to the creditor-borrower
relationship); Tung, supra note 11, at 139 (2009) (discussing ways through which creditors
monitor borrowers).
31. See generally Nini et al., supra note 11 (asserting that creditors have an active role
in corporate governance).
32. See Tung, supra note 11, at 136-38 (discussing financial covenants and investment
constraints).
33. See George G. Triantis & Ronald J. Daniels, The Role of Debt in Interactive
Corporate Governance, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1073, 1093–94 (1995) (discussing trip wire
protections in covenants).
34. See Tung, supra note 11, at 145 n132 (examining different protections in the
creditor-borrower relationship); Gabriel Jiménez et al., Determinants of Collateral 2, 32
(Eur. Fin. Ass’n 2004 Maastricht Meetings Paper No. 1455, 2004), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=565343 (examining ways to evaluate how borrower quality and
collateral used are related).
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discipline borrowers and help lenders in their monitoring activities. 35
A final type of governance device, and the one which is the focus of
this Article, is performance sensitivity. Performance sensitivity is any
mechanism or activity that permits a creditor to adjust the credit risk of the
instrument they hold before maturity (i.e., during the duration of the
instrument). The three main types of performance sensitivity I have
identified are adjusting the interest rate to the creditworthiness of the
borrower, adjusting the amount of credit available on the value of
collateral, and renegotiation after breach of a debt covenant. Performance
sensitivity is a governance mechanism because it reduces credit risk and
mitigates agency costs by altering the debtor-creditor relationship based on
the creditworthiness of the debtor. Performance sensitivity allows the price
or structure of the credit instrument to adjust to new information about the
creditor as it becomes available, thereby mitigating the costs to creditors of
informational asymmetries. Performance sensitivity also protects creditors
against moral hazard by structuring the terms of the loans in its favor if the
borrower begins to behave differently after the credit is extended.
Two underlying principles govern creditor governance devices. First,
what creditor governance mechanisms are best used to reduce the agency
costs of particular credit transactions depends on the characteristics of the
transaction.36 The important characteristics of credit transactions include
the debtor’s risk, the cost of obtaining information about the debtor (i.e.,
monitoring costs), 37 and the ease with which the credit risk of the
transaction can be transferred through a sale or synthetic risk transfer. In
general, higher risk debtors are subject to more (or more stringent)
governance devices. For example, compared to their lower risk peers,
high-risk borrowers are typically monitored more, required to post more
collateral, and are subject to more stringent covenants. 38 Second, creditor
35. See generally Charles K. Whitehead, The Evolution of Debt: Covenants, the Credit
Market, and Corporate Governance, 34 J. CORP. L., 641 (2009) (examining changes in and
discussing the bank-borrower relationship). Secondary market pricing of credit risk not
only includes the price of credit instruments in secondary market and the price of CDSs that
reference such instruments.
36. See Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction Cost Economics: The Natural Progression,
in LES PRIX NOBEL: THE NOBEL PRIZES 2009 465 (Karl Grandin ed. 2009),
http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economicsciences/laureates/2009/williamson_lecture.pdf (noting that “transactions, which differ in
their attributes, are aligned with governance structures . . . so as to effect a (mainly)
transaction cost economizing outcome”).
37. Greater informational asymmetries imply higher monitoring costs.
38. Indeed, the very existence of debt and its requirement to make fixed, periodic
interest payments may serve as a check on managerial opportunism. See Milton Harris &
Artur Raviv, Capital Structure and the Informational Role of Debt, 45 J. FIN. 321, 321-24
(1990) (examining how debt can allow investors to discipline management); Tensie
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governance mechanisms are also substitutes. For example, lenders may
engage in less monitoring or have less stringent covenants the more
collateral there is backing the loan. 39
A fundamental issue is whether debtors or creditors benefit from
performance sensitive debt. Investors would prefer to have performance
sensitive debt because it protects them from a sudden loss or collapse in
value, or simply from an increase in risk without any corresponding benefit
or protection. Performance sensitivity may be especially important because
it does not require the creditor to have to resort to secondary markets to sell
the instrument or to find another party willing to take on (or share) the risk.
In addition, one aspect of an optimal investment contract is the risk
remaining constant throughout the life of the agreement, 40 and performance
sensitivity is precisely an attempt to achieve that type of optimality. 41

Steijvers & Wim Voordeckers, Collateral and Credit Rationing: A Review of Recent
Empirical Studies as a Guide for Future Research, 23 J. ECON. SURVEYS 924, 927 (2009)
(showing that collateral is used more the higher is the debtor’s risk or the higher are
monitoring costs); Whitehead, Debt Governance, supra note 27, at 69 (discussing the
traditional role of debt).
39. In addition, less governance may take place to the extent external factors reduce the
benefits of governance. These external factors include reliance on third parties (such as
ratings agencies) to assess credit risk, explicit or implicit governmental guarantees to
creditors, an oversupply of credit, a creditor’s privileged status under bankruptcy law, or a
creditor’s short-term orientation. See Robert L. Hetzel, Too Big to Fail: Origins,
Consequences, and Outlook, ECON. REV. 1, 11 (1991) (“Too big to fail . . . limits incentives
for creditors to monitor the riskiness of bank asset portfolios.”). See also Tung, supra note
11, at 161 (looking at when lender governance is limited); Diana Hancock & Wayne
Passmore, An Analysis of Government Guarantees and the Functioning of Asset-Backed
Securities Markets (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Board, Finance and
Economics Discussion Series, Working Paper No. 2010-46, 2010) (securitization “investors
are more likely to rely on implicit government guarantees . . . rather than to conduct a
painstaking quantitative analysis of the underlying collateral”). For example, the global
credit glut from 2003 to 2007 led to competition among lenders that reduced reliance on
stringent covenants in the form of covenant-lite loans (those with little or no covenants).
See Viral V. Acharya et al., Private Equity: Boom and Bust?, 19 J. APPL. CORP. FIN. 44, 4446 (2007) (examining the leveraged buyout market); Mark J. Roe, The Derivatives Market’s
Payment Priorities as Financial Crisis Accelerator, 63 STAN. L. REV. 539, 560-64 (2011)
(examining how market-discipline mechanisms weakened); Richard Squire, Shareholder
Opportunism in a World of Risky Debt, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1151, 1200-01 (2010)
(discussing the potential impact of the Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act’s
requirement that regulators impose requirements on margins).
40. See Id.
41. Indeed, giving control to creditors contingent on the performance of debtors seems
to enhance firm value. See generally Philippe Aghion & Patrick Bolton, An Incomplete
Contracts Approach to Financial Contracting, 59 REV. ECON. STUDIES 473 (1992)
[hereinafter Aghion & Bolton] (examining how to create the most efficient system of
control allocation); Mathias Dewatripont & Jean Tirole, A Theory of Debt and Equity:
Diversity of Securities and Manager-Shareholder Congruence, 109 QRTLY. J. ECON. 1027
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Debtors, on the other hand, may not want to issue a performance sensitive
instrument because debtors benefit if the terms of their financing do not
change in favor of the creditor if their performance deteriorates. However,
firms that expect their performance to improve may benefit from financing
with performance-sensitive debt because improved performance means
their interest rate or other terms of the loan will become more attractive. In
addition, debtors may benefit from performance sensitive loans because it
allows their cost of capital to decrease (if their performance improves)
without having to find a new source of capital.42 Of course, if the debtor is
otherwise deemed too risky for any other type of loan, debtors may prefer a
performance sensitive loan to no loan at all.
B. The Mechanisms of Performance Sensitive Debt
1. Prerequisites: Screening and Monitoring
Two basic functions of lenders are screening borrowers before
extending credit and monitoring borrowers during the life of a loan.43
Screening permits informationally disadvantaged lenders to sort borrowers
by their risk and decide whether and under what terms to extend credit.44
Low-cost screening takes place when lenders offer some combination of
interest rates and collateral requirements and largely rely on borrowers to
self-select themselves. 45 High-cost screening takes place when lenders
investigate borrowers before extending credit to ensure they conform to the

(1994) [hereinafter Dewatripont & Tirole] (discussing the relationship between an optimal
capital structure and incentives that discipline managers).
42. See generally Paul Asquith, Anne Beatty & Joseph Weber, Performance Pricing in
Bank Debt Contracts, 40 J. ACCT. ECON. 101 (2005) [hereinafter Asquith et al.] (examining
the effect of performance pricing in debt contracts).
43. HANS DEGRYSE, MOSHE KIM & STEVEN ONGENA, MICROECONOMETRICS OF
BANKING: METHODS, APPLICATIONS, AND RESULTS 9 (2009) [hereinafter Degryse].
44. See generally Michael Rothschild & Joseph Stiglitz, Equilibrium in Competitive
Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information, 90 QRTLY. J.
ECON. 629 (1976) (examining the impact that information inequality can have on market
equilibriums). See also C. Monica Capra, Irene Comeig & Matilde O. Fernandez, Moral
hazard and Credit Screening: An Experiment (July 2009), 18th World IMACS / MODSIM
Congress, Cairns, Australia 13-17, at 1426 (“When creditors offer a menu of contracts
inducing the selection of firms, there is a separating equilibrium that reveals information and
can resolve rationing.”), available at https://mssanz.org.au/modsim09/D8/capra_D8.pdf.
45. See generally Giovanni Dell’Ariccia & Robert Marquez, Lending Booms and
Lending Standards, 61 J. FIN. 2511 (2006) (examining banks’ strategic behavior in relation
with the information available to them); Joseph E. Stiglitz & Andrew Weiss, Credit
Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information, 71 AMERICAN ECON. REV. 393 (1981)
(discussing how imperfect information can lead to banks using credit rationining).
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lender’s underwriting standards. 46
Performance sensitivity and screening are related in the following
way: in addition to allowing lenders to filter and choose their borrowers,
screening borrowers at the outset lowers ex post monitoring costs. By
engaging in costly screening, lenders should be better able to adopt contract
structures that would otherwise not be economically justified due to their
high monitoring costs, including the performance sensitive structures that
have high monitoring costs. Accordingly, costly screening is likely
necessary in order for a performance sensitive contract to be economically
feasible in the first place.
In addition to screening, a performance-sensitive loan also requires
substantial monitoring for the terms of the loan to be adjusted prior to
maturity. This is because the lender must ultimately observe information
about the borrower’s performance to adjust the loan’s terms. Lenders
typically monitor a borrower in at least some respect due to borrowers
generally having more information about their investments and the ability
of lenders to use the borrowed funds opportunistically or in ways that
destroy value. 47
An important aspect of lender monitoring relating to performance
sensitivity is the incentives to monitor. Performance-sensitive contracts
require significant monitoring by lenders such that without sufficient
incentives to monitor, performance sensitivity may not arise in the first
place or otherwise not be effective. 48 According to Cheol Park, a senior
lender has the strongest incentive to monitor because they have something
at stake in a liquidation whereas junior lenders will typically receive
nothing. 49 Accordingly, an equilibrium for high-risk firms is monitoring by
a private lender with senior priority. 50 Similar to Park, Amir Sufi and
Joshua Rauh argue that a lender’s incentive to engage in costly monitoring
will be strongest when the creditor is senior in the capital structure.
46. See generally Cheng Wang & Stephen D. Williamson, Debt Contracts and
Financial Intermediation with Costly Screening, 31 CANADIAN J. ECON. 573 (1998)
(examining optimal financial intermediary structures in a specific credit market model).
47. See generally Cheol Park, Monitoring and Structure of Debt Contracts, 55 J. FIN.
2157 (2000) [hereinafter Park] (discussing what optimal debt structure would look like
when there is a severe moral hazard problem). The monitoring that takes place in credit
relationships has long been the focus of finance research and scholarship. Indeed, the very
existence of financial intermediaries such as banks is generally understood to be a result of
the need for specialized monitors. Degryse, et al., supra note 43, at 9.
48. Park, supra note 47.
49. Id. A creditor will also have a stronger incentive to monitor (and seek liquidation)
in the presence of junior creditors because their claims in liquidation reduce the size of a
senior lender’s claim. Id. at 2159 (2000).
50. Park, supra note 47; Joshua D. Rauh & Amir Sufi, Capital Structure and Debt
Structure, 23 REV. FIN. STUD. 4242, 4273 (2010) [hereinafter Rauh & Sufi].
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Otherwise, the lender must share the benefits of its own monitoring efforts
with other lenders that have priority over its own claims. 51
However, a lender’s incentive to monitor may actually be the strongest
if their claim is performance sensitive. While it is true that lenders do not
want other lenders to free-ride off of their monitoring efforts, a lender may
be willing to tolerate free riding if their own costly monitoring (that other
lenders benefit from) is necessary for the lender to benefit from
performance sensitivity (e.g., being able to charge a higher interest rate).
The benefits of performance sensitivity may outweigh the costs of some
lenders free riding on another’s monitoring efforts. Accordingly, while
performance-sensitive debt is most likely to be used by senior lenders, it is
efficient for subordinate lenders to use as well.
Park also argues that the monitoring incentive should be assigned to
the lender with the lowest monitoring costs.52 However, this seems
incorrect. If a creditor is given the ability to reduce their risk commitment
in response to a borrower’s creditworthiness, they may be the most
efficient monitor even though their monitoring costs are high. Indeed,
performance sensitive contracts are an exception to the general proposition
that low cost monitors are the best monitors. Focusing on the potentially
large benefits of performance sensitivity allows one to appreciate that high
monitoring costs may be worth bearing. Bearing high monitoring costs up
front may also be efficient because the costs of monitoring likely
substantially decrease over time as a lender learns more about a borrower.
The fact that repeated borrowing from the same lender leads to lower
interest rates 53 implies that the information lenders learn over the course of
a long-term relationship substantially lowers the costs of monitoring.
2. Ex Post Sensitivity: Renegotiation and Covenants
A covenant is a contractual promise. Loans, bonds, and other debt
instruments typically contain numerous covenants from the debtor to the
creditor in addition to the fundamental promise to repay the principal and
make the scheduled interest payments. There are three categories of

51. See Rauh & Sufi, supra note 50, at 4256-57 (discussing the incentives that lead to
the senior bank monitoring).
52. Park, supra note 47.
53. Sreedhar T. Bharath, et al., Lending Relationships and Loan Contract Terms, 24
REV.
FIN.
STUD.
1141,
1141-44
(2011),
http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/content/24/4/1141.full.pdf. See also Arnoud W. A. Boot,
Relationship Banking: What Do We Know?, 9 J. FIN. INTER. 7 (2000),
http://www1.fee.uva.nl/fm/PAPeRS/Awaboot/english/Relationship_banking_know_JFI.pdf
[hereinafter Boot] (bank acquisition of soft information reduces renegotiation costs).
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covenants: affirmative promises to take certain actions, negative covenants
to not take certain actions such as incurring additional debt, and financial
covenants that promise to maintain a minimum level of performance. 54 The
primary function of covenants is to reduce agency costs by placing ex ante
constraints on debtors that prevent wealth transfers from lenders to
shareholders. 55 For example, covenants reduce moral hazard.56 Financial
covenants in particular act like early warning systems or tripwires that alert
lenders to a decrease in borrower performance.57 By providing protection
to lenders, covenants decrease credit risk and allow for loans with lower
rates of interest. 58 Another important purpose of covenants is to give
lenders a right of exit: covenants are typically structured so that their
violation permits the creditor to immediately accelerate the full amount of
the loan.
The use of covenants is indirectly related to performance sensitivity
through the relationship between covenants and monitoring. Covenants
increase the incentive to monitor 59 and help lenders monitor by requiring
borrowers to produce information. 60 Since monitoring is required for
performance sensitivity to be effective, the use of covenants facilitates
monitoring such that we should expect performance sensitive contracts to

54. FRANK FABOZZI, HANDBOOK OF FINANCE, FINANCIAL MARKETS AND INSTRUMENTS
335-336 (2008).
55. See generally Sudheer Chava & Michael Roberts, How Does Financing Impact
Investment? The Role of Debt Covenants, 63 J. FIN. 2085 (2008) [hereinafter Chava &
Roberts] (examining that the presence of covenants in financial contracts is motivated by
their ability to mitigate agency problems).
56. Smith & Warner, supra note 29.
57. Clifford Smith, A Perspective on Accounting-based Debt Covenant Violations, 68
ACCOUNTING REV. 289 (1993).
58. Greg Nini, David C. Smith & Amir Sufi, Creditor Control Rights and Firm
Investment Policy, 92 J. FIN. ECON 400 (2009) [hereinafter Nini et al.]; Michael Roberts &
Amir Sufi, Control Rights and Capital Structure: An Empirical Investigation, 64 J. FINANCE
1657 (2009) [hereinafter Roberts & Sufi]; Michael Bradley & Michael Roberts, The
Structure and Pricing of Corporate Debt Covenants, (The Fuqua School of Business, Duke
University, Working Paper, 2004); Natalia Reisel, On the Value of Restrictive Covenants:
Empirical Investigation of Public Bond Issues, (September 2010)(unpublished Ph.D
dissertation, Cox Business School at Southern Methodist University), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=644522. The scope and nature of covenants is determined in part
by tradeoffs between monitoring incentives, covenant-based hold up costs, and an increase
in informational advantages to the lender. Robert Prilmeier, The Structuring of Financial
Covenants When Lenders Acquire Soft Information, (May 14, 2011)(unpublished Ph.D
dissertation,
Ohio
State
University),
available
at
http://fisher.osu.edu/supplements/10/10869/Structuring-Financial.pdf.
59. Raghuram Rajan & Andrew Winton, Covenants and Collateral as Incentives to
Monitor, 50 J. FIN. 1113 (1995) [hereinafter Rajan & Winton].
60. Roberts & Sufi, supra note 58.
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make use of information-producing covenants. 61 Likewise, the use of
covenants and performance sensitive provisions may to some extent be
complementary because creditors already engaging in monitoring for one
purpose will find it less costly to monitor for the other.
The use of covenants is also related to performance sensitivity through
the relationship between covenants and renegotiation. Breach of a
covenant typically qualifies as a technical default that gives the lender the
right to immediately accelerate the full amount of the loan. In practice,
however, the remedy of acceleration is rarely used. Most covenant
breaches are technical and are typically waived by lender. 62 Borrowers
often breach a covenant,63 including borrowers that are healthy. 64 To the
extent there is any change after breach of a covenant, it results in the loan
being renegotiated.65 Empirical studies find that covenant breaches cause
loans to be modified with higher interest rates, less available credit, and a
decrease in the borrower’s investment spending. 66 This way, the process of
covenant breach and renegotiation in favor of the lender enables the lender
to be compensated for an increase in risk. 67 Loan renegotiation is common,
with one study finding that 76 percent of public companies’ loans were
renegotiated before maturity. 68 Covenant breach and renegotiation in favor
of the lender is a form of performance sensitivity because it results in loan
terms adjusting in response to the borrower’s performance. The fact that
covenant breaches are common indicates that renegotiation is an important
form of performance sensitivity.

61. This turns out to be true in the case of asset-based loans. See infra Section III.A.
62. Roberts & Sufi, supra note 58.
63. Michael Roberts & Amir Sufi, Renegotiation of Financial Contracts: Evidence
from Private Credit Agreements, 93 J. FIN. ECON. 159 (2009).
64. Robert Prilmeier, The Structuring of Financial Covenants When Lenders Acquire
Soft Information, (May 14, 2011)(unpublished Ph.D dissertation, Ohio State University),
available
at
http://fisher.osu.edu/supplements/10/10869/Structuring-Financial.pdf
[hereinafter Prilmeier]
65. Nini et al., supra note 58.
66. Cem Demiroglu & Christopher. M. James, The Information Content of Bank Loan
Covenants, 23 REV. FIN. STUD. 3700 (2010); Roberts & Sufi, supra note 63.
67. Clifford W. Smith, A Perspective on Violations of Accounting Based Debt
Covenants, 68 Accounting Rev. 289 (1993); Ivan T. Ivanov, Contractual Contingencies and
Renegotiation: Evidence from the Use of Pricing Grids, 7 (May 16, 2012) [hereinafter
Ivanov] (unpublished dissertation, Kogod School of Business, American University), (“This
security mechanism allows banks to be fairly compensated for increases in borrower credit
risk.”)
available
at
http://www.american.edu/kogod/research/upload/Ivanovperformance_pricing15.pdf.
68. Yiwei Dou, The Debt-Contracting Value of Accounting Numbers, Renegotiation,
and Investment Efficiency (February 2013) (unpublished dissertation, Stern School of
Business,
New
York
University),
available
at
http://www.capana.net/conference2013/DOUYiwei2013Feb.pdf.
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Although financial economists correctly note that a covenant breach
allows a lender to reassess the borrower’s creditworthiness and impose
value-enhancing additional covenants,69 the more important aspect from a
performance sensitive view is that post-breach renegotiation results in the
lender’s risk being adjusted (i.e., reduced) while the loan is still
outstanding. In addition, while economists are correct to view covenants as
increasing firm value by allowing control to shift to creditors outside of
bankruptcy, 70 it is important to note that this control consists of
performance sensitivity — not management. Lenders do not begin to run
the borrower’s business once a covenant is breached; rather, they reduce
the risks they are exposed to through renegotiation.
3. Ex Ante Performance Sensitivity
i. Performance Pricing
Commercial loans may contain performance pricing provisions that
automatically adjust the loan’s interest rate in response to the performance
of the borrower. Performance pricing is a feature that causes the interest to
fluctuate depending on the borrower’s performance as measured by a
borrower’s credit rating or financial ratios such as debt-to-income,
leverage, or interest coverage. 71 Performance pricing provisions may be
structured so that the interest rate increases if the borrower becomes less
creditworthy or the interest rate decreases if performance improves (or
both). 72 Performance pricing came into widespread use in the 1990s and by
one estimate is currently found in nearly three-quarters of all bank loans. 73
Figure 2a is an example of a performance pricing grid where the interest
rate (as for Eurodollar Loans and Base Rate Loans) increases as the
borrower’s performance decreases (as measured by the Consolidated
Leverage Ratio). 74 Figure 2b is an example of a performance pricing grid
where the borrower’s performance is measured by the borrower’s credit
ratings. 75

69. Chava & Roberts, supra note 55; Nini et al., supra note 58.
70. Aghion & Bolton, supra note 41; Dewatripont & Tirole, supra note 41; Ilia D.
Dichev & Douglas J. Skinner, Large–Sample Evidence on the Debt Covenant Hypothesis,
40 J. ACCT. RES. 1091 (2002) [hereinafter Dichev & Skinner].
71. Asquith et al., supra note 42.
72. Id.
73. Roberts & Sufi, supra note 63.
74. Parexel Int’l Corp., Term Loan Facility, (January 22, 2013)
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/799729/000079972913000002/a103termloanfacilit
yagreem.htm.
75. Best Buy Co. Inc., 364-Day Credit Agreement, (April 11, 2013),
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Figure 2a

Figure 2b

Performance pricing accordingly is a type of automatic, ex ante
performance sensitivity negotiated prior to the loan transaction is closed.
In the case of interest-increasing arrangements, performance pricing
decreases the risk of the loan to counteract a decrease in the performance of
the borrower. A higher interest rate compensates the lender for the increase
in borrower risk. In the case of interest-decreasing arrangements, reducing

http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/764478/000076447813000051/exhibit10162813rcf.htm.
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the interest rate in response to improved performance tailors the loan to be
more in line with what the borrower could receive at a market rate, and
reduces incentives for the borrower to prepay, refinance, or attempt to
renegotiate a lower interest rate.
ii. Collateralization
Securing a loan with collateral (collateralization), typically an asset
owned by the borrower, is a basic creditor governance mechanism.
Collateralization can help reduce potential losses to lenders because
collateral can be sold and used to repay the loan if a borrower does not
have enough cash. 76 A primary justification for the use of collateral is that
collateralization is a mechanism to reduce agency costs. In particular,
collateralization can reduce adverse selection costs by allowing higher
quality borrowers to pledge collateral to signal their quality and thereby
help lenders screen borrowers. 77 Other theories argue that collateral is used
to mitigate the effects of moral hazard (including risk-shifting and reduced
effort) 78 or the difficulty of enforcing contracts. 79 Empirical studies find
that companies that pledge (more) collateral tend to be riskier.80
The use of collateral by itself is a blunt instrument in terms of
performance sensitivity. However, there are two ways in which collateral
makes loans more performance sensitive. First, using collateral assists
lenders in tailoring their risk exposure ex ante because lenders are willing
to make larger or longer-duration loans to borrowers that pledge collateral
with higher liquidation values. 81 Collateral puts a lower bound of a
76. Tung, supra note 11, at 145 n.132.
77. Effi Benmelech & Nittai Bergman, Collateral Pricing, (AFA 2008 New Orleans
Meetings Paper, January 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=960787 [hereinafter
Benmelech & Bergman]; Gabriel Jiménez et al., Determinants of Collateral 32 (EFA 2004
Maastricht
Meetings,
Working
Paper
No.
1455,
2004),
available
at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=565343.
78. Aghion & Bolton, supra note 41; Bengt Holmstrom & Jean Tirole, Financial
Intermediation, Loanable Funds, and The Real Sector, 112 QRTLY. J. ECON. 663 (1997)
[hereinafter Holmstrom & Tirole].
79. John H. Boyd & Bruce D. Smith, How Good are Standard Debt Contracts?
Stochastic Versus Nonstochastic Monitoring in a Costly State Verification Environment, 67
J. BUS. 539 (1994).
80. See generally Allen N. Berger & Gregory Udell, Collateral, Loan Quality and
Bank Risk, 25 J. MONET. ECON. 21 (1990) (finding that “collateral is most often associated
with riskier borrowers, riskier loans and riskier banks”).
81. Efraim Benmelech, Asset Salability and Debt Maturity: Evidence from 19th
Century American Railroads, 22 REV. FIN. STUDIES 1545 (2009); Efraim Benmelech, Mark
J. Garmaise & Tobias J. Moskowitz, Do Liquidation Values Affect Financial Contracts?
Evidence from Commercial Loan Contracts and Zoning Regulation, 120 QUARTERLY J.
ECON 1121 (2005); Oliver Hart & John Moore, A Theory of Debt Based on the Inalienability
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creditor’s possible loss (i.e., at the liquidation value of collateral).82
Collateral may also increase performance sensitivity indirectly to the extent
it creates more incentives to monitor. For example, collateral agreements
may give lenders the ability to demand additional collateral. 83 On the other
hand, monitoring and collateral may be substitutes to the extent there is less
of an incentive to monitor secured loans due to the very fact that the lender
can resort to the collateral in case of borrower default. 84 There is
conflicting evidence regarding whether using collateral or monitoring is a
lower cost form of governance. 85
Second, collateralization is a performance-sensitive debt characteristic
when the terms of the loan adjust to the value of the borrower’s assets. For
example, the size of the loan may increase if the value of the collateral
increases, and vice versa. In addition, the size of the loan may be required
to have a fixed ratio to the value of the collateral in an attempt to keep the
lender’s risk constant, despite changes in the value of the collateral. A loan
may also contain covenants that are triggered if there is a significant drop
in the value or credit ratings of the collateral. In such a case the borrower
may be required to post additional collateral or repay the loan upon demand
of the lender.
In practice, there are several types of performance sensitive
collateralization arrangements. One type is “margin financing,” which
consists of financing the purchase of stocks or bonds with funds borrowed
from a broker and having the purchased securities serve as collateral.
Under such an arrangement, the broker will demand additional collateral
(i.e., the securities) or cash if the value of the collateral falls below a preestablished level. A similar arrangement is also made in futures, swaps,
and other derivatives transactions. For example, in a swaps transaction, one
party will post collateral at the outset of the transaction. At least daily, the
value of the position will be re-evaluated and obligate the party on the side
of the trade with the lower value to post addition collateral. 86

of Human Capital, 109 QUARTERLY J. ECON. 841 (1994); Benmelech & Bergman, supra
note 77.
82. However, the liquidation value of the collateral may decrease over the life of loan
or be worth more to the borrower than the lender. Roberts & Sufi, supra note 63.
83. Rajan & Winton, supra note 59.
84. Michael Manove et al., Collateral vs. Project Screening: A Model of Lazy Banks,
(Ctr. For Studies in Econ. and Fin., Working Paper No. 10, 2001), available at
http://www.csef.it/WP/wp10.pdf.
85. See Aaron A. Goetsmann & Gordon S. Roberts, Bank Relationships and
Collateralization, in CAPITAL STRUCTURE AND CORPORATE FINANCING DECISIONS: THEORY,
EVIDENCE, AND PRACTICE 287-80 (Baker and Martin eds. 2011).
86. See Shadab, supra note 9, at 1041-42 (providing an overview of how collateral
works as a governance mechanism).
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In the commercial loan context, collateral financing takes the form of
an asset-based loan in which the available amount of credit is limited to a
specified percentage of eligible assets that make up the loan’s “borrowing
base.” If the value of the borrowing base falls below that of outstanding
loans, the borrower is typically required to repay or collateralize (with
cash) the deficiency. 87 Asset-based loans as a type of performancesensitive debt are analyzed in depth in Section III.
4. Lines of Credit
A line of credit is a specified amount of funds that a borrower may
borrow in separate discrete amounts up until the maximum (the “line”) for
a specific amount of time (typically, a year). In a committed line of credit,
the lender is obligated to lend up until the line and would be in default to
the borrower for not doing so. The borrower only pays interest on the
amount they have actually borrowed under the line, and not the total
amount available. 88 In a revolving line of credit, a borrower can borrow
and repay any amount borrowed, usually for a specific time period of two
to three years. A line of credit can benefit borrowers because, with a credit
line, a borrower does not have to pay interest on funds it has not drawn
down. A credit line also benefits lenders because it may reduce the agency
costs that arise from managers having access to a surplus of cash.
Theories of credit lines often focus on the choice of obtaining liquidity
through cash or a line of credit. These theories argue that lines of credit
can be more efficient in helping firms manage their short-term liquidity
needs than holding cash, largely by providing a form of insurance against
cash flow disruptions. 89 Agency theory also suggests that lines of credit are
uniquely available from banks and other specialized lenders because they
are able to bear the relatively higher monitoring costs and other costs
associated with administering credit lines. 90

87. Borrowing Base: Overview (2013), PRACTICAL LAW (Apr. 14, 2014 3:44 AM),
http://us.practicallaw.com/2-501-4029?source=relatedcontent [hereinafter Practical Law]
88. FRANK J. FABOZZI, THE COMPLETE CFO HANDBOOK: FROM ACCOUNTING TO
ACCOUNTABILITY 88 (2007). If the line of credit is committed, the borrower also pays a
commitment fee (typically calculated as a percentage of the outstanding amount not
borrowed) or is required to keep a cash balance in a separate account (known as a
compensating balance). Id.
89. See generally Holmstrom & Tirole, supra note 78.
90. See generally Evan Gatev & Philip Strahan, Banks’ Advantage in Hedging
Liquidity Risk: Theory and Evidence from the Commercial Paper Market, 61 J. FIN. 867
(2006) (examining how banks are able to hedge against liquidity shocks affecting entire
markets); Anil Kashyap et al., Banks as Liquidity Providers: An Explanation for the
Coexistence of Lending and Deposit-Taking. 57 J. FIN. 33 (2002) (examining how banks
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A line of credit by itself is generally not performance sensitive. A
decrease in a borrower’s creditworthiness will not necessarily decrease the
amount already outstanding to the borrower or the size of the credit facility.
There are, however, several ways in which a line of credit depends on the
creditworthiness of the borrower. 91 First, a line of credit may be contingent
on a borrower’s compliance with loan covenants. In addition to demanding
immediate repayment of the entire loan facility, violations of covenants
may allow the lender to decrease the size of the line of credit or negotiate
other provisions of the loan to protect themselves. Lines of credit also
typically have material adverse change clauses that allow a lender to
withhold funds if the borrower undergoes a significant decrease in
creditworthiness. The amount of funds available under a credit line may
also be tied to the value of the assets that secure the facility. In an assetbased loan, a borrowing base provision ties the size of the credit line to
value of certain assets, causing the size of the credit facility to fluctuate
based on the assets’ value.
II. IMPLICATIONS OF PERFORMANCE-SENSITIVE DEBT
This Section considers how my theory of performance-sensitive debt
interacts with three bodies of academic finance literature: incomplete
contracting, the economics of renegotiation, and capital structure research.
These literatures support the proposition that performance-sensitivity is an
efficiency enhancing governance mechanism for high-risk borrowers. This
Section also considers how performance sensitivity, despite increasing
efficiency, may increase the ability of lenders to be opportunistic and
benefit themselves at the expense of lenders. Subsequent Sections of this
Article apply the ideas developed in this Section by analyzing
performance-sensitive asset-based loans in general and when made to highrisk startups in particular.
A. Theoretical Implications
1. Incomplete Contracting
A central tenet of the theory of incomplete contracts is that all realworld contracts are incomplete to some extent due to factors including

provide liquidity on demand).
91. See generally Amir Sufi, Bank Lines of Credit in Corporate Finance: An Empirical
Analysis, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 1057 (2009) (explaining how banks are only viable liquidity
substitutes for organizations with high cash flow).
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imperfect knowledge (bounded rationality), the inability for third parties to
verify future states of the world (and hence enforce contract terms), the
upfront costs of negotiating, and the ex post costs of monitoring. 92 A
contract is complete to the extent it makes obligations contingent on
circumstances, a property known as state-contingency. 93
Ex ante performance sensitivity is a form of contractual completeness
because the terms of the agreement are contingent upon the borrower’s
performance. Contracts with performance pricing and borrowing base
provisions are more complete than contracts that do not adjust the terms of
the agreement in relation to the performance of the borrower.
Contract theorists argue that transaction costs and property rights
determine the relative completeness of efficient contracts. 94 This research
also finds that complete contracts are more efficient when (1) future states
are third-party verifiable (and hence enforceable); 95 (2) renegotiation is
costly; (3) or monitoring costs are low. In general, incomplete contracting
research supports direct empirical findings that performance-sensitive
contracts are more efficient when agency costs or transaction costs are
high. 96

92. See Benjamin E. Hermalin et al., Contract Law, in 1 HANDBOOK OF LAW AND
ECONOMICS, 63, 70-75 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007) [hereinafter
Hermalin] (discussing how the desirability of contract liability depends on the ex post
bargaining situations of the parties). See generally George Hendrikse & Josef Windsperger,
Determinants of Contractual Completeness in Franchising, in NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN THE
THEORY OF NETWORKS: FRANCHISING, COOPERATIVES AND ALLIANCES 13 (Mika Tuunanen et
al. eds., 2011) [hereinafter Hendrikse & Windsperger] (examining what determines whether
a contract is complete).
93. See generally Gillian K. Hadfield, Judicial Competence and the Interpretation of
Incomplete Contracts, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 159 (1994) (examining whether the judicial
system is competent in filling in contract ambiguities and how it does so); Alan Schwartz,
Relational Contracts in the Courts: An Analysis of Incomplete Agreements and Judicial
Strategies, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 271 (1992) (examining how judges address relational and
incomplete contracts).
94. See Hendrikse & Windsperger, supra note 92, at 13 (explaining how contract
completeness is determined and some factors that are examined).
95. See Hermalin, supra note 92, at 63 (discussing the formal conditions of contractual
completeness).
96. See generally Asquith et al., supra note 42 (examining the relationship between
bank debt interest rate spreads and contracts with performance pricing). See Ilia D. Dichev
et al., The Role and Characteristics of Accounting-based Performance Pricing in Private
Debt Contracts 2 (June 2002) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with Social Sciences
Research Network), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=318399 (arguing that
“performance pricing improves the efficiency of contracting by reducing renegotiation costs
and renewal costs, alleviating agency costs, and allowing for longer life contracts”). See
generally J.L. Souza, Effectiveness of Commercial Debt Pricing Using Alternate Pricing
Structures (Working Paper, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2135714 (stating
that performance pricing is efficient and reduces agency costs); Karan Bhanot & Antonio S.
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First, relatively complete performance-sensitive debt contracts are
indeed third-party verifiable. Performance pricing and borrowing bases
rely on verifiable outcomes; namely, the measurable performance of the
borrower and the market value of the borrowing base assets.
Second, performance sensitivity lowers renegotiation costs because it
automatically adjusts the exposure of the lender to the borrower—without
having to renegotiate any contract terms. Doing so should increase
contracting efficiency because contracts with less room for (Paretoimproving) renegotiation are more efficient. Indeed, a major force driving
the widespread adoption of performance pricing provisions in the 1990s
was to save on the transaction costs of renegotiating loan contracts.97
Empirical studies also find that performance pricing is associated with less
room for mutually beneficial renegotiation, 98 implying that such provisions
are more efficient. In addition, Tim Adam and Daniel Streitz found that
covenants are looser if performance pricing provisions are used. This
finding implies that performance pricing is a substitute for covenant-related
renegotiation, 99 an implication that is consistent with creditor governance
devices being tradeoffs with one another.
Third, because performance sensitivity requires costly monitoring to
implement, such contracts are far more likely to be efficient if monitoring
costs are low—just as incomplete contracting research suggests. However,
there may be an efficient equilibrium where contracts combine monitoring

Mello, Should Corporate Debt Include a Rating Trigger?, 79 J. FIN. ECON. 69 (2006)
(examining the incentives for including a rating trigger); Gustavo Manso et al.,
Performance-Sensitive
Debt,
REV.
FIN.
STUDIES
(2010),
available
at
http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/manso/psd.pdf (examining performance-sensitive debt);
Kamphol Panyagomet et al., Performance Pricing Covenants and Corporate Loan Spreads
(Working Paper, 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2255061
[hereinafter
Kamphol Panyagomet et al.] (finding that interest rates are lower for interest-increasing
performance pricing loans).
97. See Ivan T. Ivanov, Essays on Debt Financing and Financial Distress 6 (2012)
(unpublished
Ph.D.
dissertation,
University
of
Rochester),
available
at
https://urresearch.rochester.edu/institutionalPublicationPublicView.action?institutionalItemI
d=24470 (“Discussions with practitioners revealed that saving on renegotiation costs was
one of the primary reasons for the trend towards widespread adoption of performance
pricing in the bank debt market in the early 1990s.”).
98. Id. See also Valeri V. Nikolaev, Scope for Renegotiation in Private Debt Contracts
22 ( Working Paper, 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2012526 [hereinafter
Nikolaev] (examining the relationship between conflicts in negotiating contracts and debt
contract renegotiations).
99. See Tim R. Adam & Daniel Streitz, Bank Lending Relationships and the Use of
Performance Sensitive Debt 3-4 (SFB 649 Discussion, Working Paper No. 2013-027, 2013),
available
at
https://www.econstor.eu/dspace/bitstream/10419/79608/1/746444923.pdf
[hereinafter Tim R. Adam & Daniel Streitz] (demonstrating that performance-sensitive debt
decreases hold-up problems in relationships involving repeated interaction).
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and contractual completeness. Performance pricing is a way to reveal
information and overcome informational asymmetries. 100 That is, it may be
efficient to undertake costly monitoring in the presence of a relatively
complete contract because the benefits to the lender in the form of having
performance-sensitive debt contract outweigh the additional monitoring
costs. The foregoing is also supported by a model developed by Alexei
Tchistyi, who argues that performance pricing is an optimal contract in the
presence of an opportunistic manager with more information than the
lender. 101
A final important aspect of the relationship between contract
efficiency and performance-sensitive debt is that empirical studies suggest
that performance sensitivity creates more efficient contracts in the context
of high-risk borrowers. Adam and Streitz find that (accounting-based)
performance pricing provisions are more likely to be found in a long-term,
repeated lending relationship and with less established firms that have
fewer outside financing options.102 Although the authors interpret these
findings as borrowers attempting to protect themselves against being held
up by lenders in renegotiation, the findings are also consistent with
performance sensitivity being used by lenders for firms that are the riskiest
or have the most informational asymmetries. Asquith et al. find that
interest-increasing performance pricing is more likely to be used in loans if
the borrower is more likely to experience a decline in credit quality,
especially for loans where the borrower can increase their borrowings with
lender approval.103 With respect to borrowing base provisions, empirical
evidence finds that the provisions are used by firms with higher risk and
informational asymmetry 104 and that the use of borrowing base provisions
increases as creditworthiness decreases. 105 Empirical evidence also finds
that performance-sensitive borrowing base provisions are associated with a
larger scope for mutually beneficial renegotiation, which provides
additional support that borrowing bases are best for high-risk firms that

100. See Kamphol Panyagomet et al., supra note 96, at 26 (finding that “[p]erformance
pricing covenants . . . are predicted to reduce loan spreads as they serve to control costs
associated with asymmetric information . . . .”).
101. See generally Alexei Tchistyi, Security Design with Correlated Hidden Cash
Flows: The Optimality of Performance Pricing (Haas School of Business, University of
California,
Berkeley,
Working
Paper,
2013),
available
at
http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/Tchistyi/MD.pdf (examining optimal security design in
instances where project managers can divert cash flows for personal use).
102. Tim R. Adam & Daniel Streitz, supra note 99, at 3-4.
103. Asquith et al., supra note 42.
104. Mark J. Flannery & Xiaohong (Sara) Wang, Borrowing Base Revolvers: Liquidity
for Risk Firms, (Working Paper , 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1741306.
105. Rauh & Sufi, supra note 50, at 4270-71
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lenders should expect to learn about over time. 106
2. Loan Renegotiation and Efficiency
Renegotiating a loan contract before maturity is an ex post form of
performance sensitivity that seems to generally increase contract efficiency.
Renegotiation is efficient when it allows the parties to strike a better
bargain based upon changed circumstances or new information. This is
usually the case when renegotiation is cheap and incorporates new
information about the borrower and hence presents an opportunity for the
parties to adjust the agreement to better reflect the true risk of the loan.107
There tends to be more room for efficient (Pareto-improving) renegotiation
when there are high informational asymmetries and agency conflicts are
likely. 108
Renegotiation may be inefficient when the costs of renegotiation are
high, borrowers possess informational advantages over lenders, 109 or
multiple creditors create collective action problems. 110 Renegotiation may
also be inefficient because, if renegotiation in favor of the lender is
anticipated at the time of contracting, it may lead the borrower to
underinvest and not expend as much effort as it otherwise would have to
avoid having its profits appropriated by a lender with bargaining power (the
hold-up problem). 111
More or tighter covenants create more potential for covenant breaches,
and hence increase the likelihood of renegotiation.112 Theory and evidence
on the use of debt covenants suggests that renegotiation after breach of a
covenant is an efficiency enhancing activity. Debt covenants are tighter the
more borrowers know about projects than lenders and the more costly it is
to become informed. 113 Indeed, as lenders learn more about borrowers
through repeated borrowings, lenders reduce covenants.114 These findings
106. Nikolaev, supra note 98, at 22-23.
107. See id. at 7-9.
108. Ivanov, supra note 67.
109. There is less scope for renegotiation the more there is informational asymmetry.
Nikolaev, supra note 98, at 7-9.
110. Klaus M. Schmidt, The Economics of Covenants as a Means of Efficient Creditor
Protection, 7 EURO. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 89, 90 (2006).
111. Id.
112. Renegotiable contracts also have tighter covenants because lenders know they can
be relaxed later. Mitchel Berlin & Loretta J. Mester, Debt Covenants and Renegotiation, 2 J.
FIN. INTER. 95 (1992) [hereinafter Berlin & Mester].
113. Nicolae Garleanu & Jeffrey Zwiebel, Design and Renegotiation of Debt Covenants,
22 REV. FIN. STUD. 749 (2009); Park, supra note 47; Prilmeier, supra note 64, at 5 (covenant
tightness decreases the closer the relationship between debtors and creditors).
114. Prilmeier, supra note 64, at 4-5. Covenant tightness contains private information
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indicate that there are more or tighter covenants when lenders know less
about borrowers and want to reserve the right to renegotiate. Renegotiation
accordingly seems to progressively reveal more information about
borrowers to create more efficient contracts.115
The fact that borrowers’ earnings and stock price improve after
covenant violations 116 also suggests that performance sensitivity through
renegotiation is efficiency enhancing. Contracts with more or tighter
covenants generally have more room for value-enhancing (efficient)
renegotiation. 117 In addition, negative covenants are more valuable when
borrowers are more likely to impose moral hazard agency costs on lenders
(such as risk-shifting, excessive dividends, and over or underinvestment). 118 Part of the value likely stems from lenders wanting to
renegotiate the covenants in their favor if they are violated.
Performance sensitivity through renegotiation seems particularly
valuable for higher risk borrowers. Sufi and Rauh, for example, find a
sharp increase in covenant usage as a borrower’s credit quality decreases.119
For high-risk borrowers, value-enhancing renegotiation that reduces
information problems and agency costs takes place almost continuously. 120
Indeed, high-risk borrowers likely benefit the most from renegotiation
because it generally results in more borrower-friendly terms. 121 For
example, a lender may initially set loan terms too strict to compensate for a
potential decrease in a high-risk borrower’s performance over the life of the
loan. 122 Nonetheless, any problems a lender has estimating the borrower’s
decrease in performance can be mitigated by setting covenants tightly so
that they are likely to be renegotiated.123

about the firm’s prospects, but covenant intensity does not. Id. at 6; Demiroglu & James,
supra note 66.
115. Boot, supra note 53.
116. Nini et al., supra note 58.
117. The particular covenants are those that constrain managers and certain financial
covenants. Nikolaev, supra note 98.
118. Michael Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976); Stewart C.
Meyers, The Determinants of Corporate Borrowing, 5 J. FIN. ECON. 147 (1977); Smith &
Warner, supra note 29.
119. Rauh & Sufi, supra note 50, at 4270.
120. Nikolaev, supra note 98, at 4-8.
121. See Berlin & Mester, supra note 112 (finding that “firms with high ex ante credit
risk find the option to renegotiate most valuable”).
122. See Asquith et al., supra note 42.
123. Dichev & Skinner, supra note 70.
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3. Capital Structure
My theory of performance sensitivity draws upon, has implications
for, and challenges existing theories of corporate finance and debt
contracting. Capital structure refers to a fundamental characteristic of any
firm; namely, the ratio of its debt to equity. Capital structure theory
investigates why firms adopt a particular capital structure and the
efficiency of doing so. 124 My theory casts a new light on capital structure
theory, and posits that capital structure decisions take into account the
performance sensitivity of the instruments available to firms. Borrowers
with higher risk or agency costs will raise capital with the most
performance sensitive instruments—debt with robust covenants,
performance pricing provisions, or borrowing base clauses. To properly
assess the role of performance sensitivity, we must compare not only the
ratio of debt to equity but also the types of debt, which may be more or less
performance sensitive.
The basis of much capital structure theory is the Modigliani–Miller
irrelevance principle first developed in 1958. It posits that under certain
assumptions a firm’s choice between debt and equity is irrelevant to its
value. 125 These assumptions, including perfectly efficient markets and the
lack of taxes, bankruptcy, or agency costs, are highly unrealistic.
Moreover, the Modigliani–Miller irrelevance principle implicitly assumes
that financial instruments do not vary in their degree of performance
sensitivity. Due to the principle’s lack of realism, several other capital
structure theories have developed in the years since the principle was first
developed.
According to the trade-off theory, a firm’s choice of capital structure
represents a tradeoff between the actual costs and benefits to the firm from
financing with either debt or equity. The most important tradeoffs include
the tax deduction and agency cost reduction of debt financing versus the
increased bankruptcy cost of additional leverage.126 According to the

124. Based on a sample of 1889 public non-financial companies, Rauh and Sufi found
that the average debt to capital ratio was 50 percent and that bonds and bank debt make up
19 percent and 13 percent of the capital structure, respectively. Rauh & Sufi, supra note 50.
In terms of priority, they found that on average 25 percent of a firm’s capital structure
consists of unsecured debt, 15 percent is made up of secured debt, and subordinated debt
(mostly bonds and convertible debt) makes up 11 percent. Id. Most firms use more than one
type of debt financing and about a quarter make a significant change in their debt structure
over time. Id.
125. Franco Modigliani & Merton H. Miller, The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance
and the Theory of Investment, 48 AM. ECON. REV. 261 (1958).
126. Stewart C. Myers & Nicholas S. Majluf, Corporate Financing and Investment
Decisions When Firms Have Information That Investors Do Not Have, 13 J. FIN. ECON. 187
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pecking-order theory, a firm’s capital structure reflects the general
preference of firms for funding themselves first with their own profits, then
debt, and then equity—in that order. 127 This “pecking order” is driven by
manager-investor informational asymmetries, and also by agency conflicts,
and taxes. 128 For example, when investors perceive that managers have
more information than they do, they will create an adverse selection
problem and underprice the firm’s equity securities, which gives the firm a
preference for debt over equity. 129 According to the signaling theory of
capital structure, firms use their capital structure to signal quality about
For
themselves and thereby overcome asymmetric information. 130
example, debt is issued by firms to signal high quality as reflected in their
ability to pay it back. 131
Focusing on performance sensitivity has implications for all of these
theories. First, it suggests that an additional important tradeoff between
debt and equity are the costs and benefits of using performance-sensitive
financing. As noted earlier,132 firms that expect their performance to
improve may benefit from financing with performance-sensitive debt
because improved performance means their interest rate or other terms of
the loan will become more attractive. Second, my theory also challenges
the pecking order theory because it suggests that in some cases
informational asymmetries may make a firm prefer equity over debt. For
example, an informationally opaque borrower may prefer to issue relatively
costly equity than agree to a performance-sensitive loan that may trap it
with higher interest rates if its performance declines. Third, my theory
bolsters signaling theory because it suggests that firms attempt to signal
quality through performance sensitive debt not only because they have to
pay it back, but also because issuers are willing to commit to having their
capital taken away or become more costly due to their increased risk over
the life of the loan. Consistent with this explanation is a study of
performance-sensitive debt finding that borrowers agree to performance
pricing to signal their quality to lenders and are rewarded with larger and

(1984) [hereinafter Myers & Majluf].
127. Id.
128. Stewart C. Myers, Financing of Corporations, in 1A HANDBOOK OF THE
ECONOMICS OF FINANCE: CORPORATE FINANCE (Constantinides & Stulz eds. 2003); J.B.
Heaton, Managerial Optimism and Corporate Finance, 31 FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 33
(2002).
129. Myers & Majluf, supra note 126.
130. See Stephen A. Ross, The Determination of Financial Structure: The IncentiveSignaling Approach, 8 BEL. J. ECON. 23 (1977).
131. Id.
132. See infra, Section I.A.
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cheaper loans. 133
Other theories and findings in corporate finance are consistent with
my claim that firms with lower creditworthiness tend to issue more
performance sensitive debt. One theory is that firms switch to using nonperformance sensitive debt (i.e., bonds) from performance sensitive bank
debt as their credit quality improves. 134 One explanation for this is that
high quality borrowers can borrow at arm’s length in capital markets and
not bear costs associated with bank monitoring. 135 But another explanation
is based on performance sensitivity: lenders are not willing to extend credit
to low-quality firms unless their outstanding risk adjusts to the performance
of borrowers. The need for performance sensitivity also explains why the
greater monitoring intensity found in private debt compared to bonds is
higher with lower quality firms. 136 Sufi and Ruah find that while lower
quality firms rely on a mix of different types of debt instruments, higher
quality investment grade firms rely on senior unsecured debt and equity. In
other words, lower quality firms have much less access to unsecured debt
that lacks performance sensitivity. 137 Lower quality firms rely on bank
debt, which is performance sensitive because it has tight covenants and
(most likely) performance pricing provisions. 138 Likewise, when firms’
credit ratings are downgraded, they increasingly rely on bank debt. 139
Accordingly, borrowers’ use of more or less performance sensitive debt is
consistent with such debt being used by higher risk borrowers.
B. Creditor Opportunism
Performance sensitive contracts may either increase or decrease the

133. Taylor A. Begley, Signaling, Financial Constraints, and Performance Sensitive
Debt, (Working Paper, 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2140217 (find[ing] that
constrained firms that use convex pricing grids receive loans that are 21-28% larger with a
spread that is 31-37 basis points lower than observationally similar borrowers that use fixed
spread loans”). Bannier and Wiemann argue that only credit ratings-based performance
pricing, and not accounting-based performance pricing, are used to signal a borrower’s
quality because the former provide for larger spread reductions. Christina E. Bannier & M.
Wiemann, Performance Pricing in Bank Loan Contracts–Accounting-Based Versus RatingBased
Pricing
Designs,
(Working
Paper,
2013),
available
at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2141797.
134. Arnold W. A. Boot & Anjan V. Thakor, Financial System Architecture, 10 REV.
FIN. STUDIES 693 (1997).
135. Douglas W. Diamond, Monitoring and Reputation: The Choice Between Bank
Loans and Directly Placed Debt, 99 J. POL. ECON. 689 (1991).
136. Rauh & Sufi, supra note 50, at 4273.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
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ability of creditors to engage in opportunistic behavior against borrowers.
Creditor opportunism is conduct taken by a creditor to obtain a benefit,
such as higher interest rates or tighter covenants, not explicitly or implicitly
agreed upon by the initial agreement. 140 Creditor opportunism typically
consists of creditors taking advantage of a distressed borrower in a way that
benefits themselves at the expense of the debtor.141 Creditor opportunism
may arise more generally because the informational advantages a lender
obtains after having a long-term relationship with a borrower allow the
lender to take advantage of the fact that the borrower will incur additional
costs if it tries to obtain a new lender.142
The greater the likelihood or scope for renegotiation, the more likely it
is that lenders will be able to behave opportunistically. This is because
lenders with a credible threat of liquidation may be able to renegotiate the
loan in their favor. However, such renegotiation may be inefficient due to
causing the borrower to increase its risk taking activities subsequent to the
renegotiation to compensate for having to share more of its profits with
then lender. 143 It may also cause inefficiencies because the mere prospect
of having to share more profits with a lender than originally anticipated can
reduce the incentives of borrowers to engage in profitable projects.144
However, ex ante performance sensitive contracts in the form of
performance pricing and collateralization may reduce the ability for
creditors to act opportunistically. Ex ante performance sensitivity reduces
the scope of renegotiation by setting at the outset of the contract what
debtor or asset distress may do to the interest rate or loan amount. The
impact of borrower distress on certain aspects of the loan is already
determined such that creditors cannot take advantage of the distress. In
addition, to the extent that ex ante performance sensitivity is generally a
tradeoff with tighter or more extensive covenants, performance sensitive
loans will be less likely to be renegotiated in favor of the creditor in the
first place. On the other hand, because collateral-financed performance
sensitive loans require giving the lender a security interest in assets that
determine the size of the loan obligation, the loans may increase creditor

140. Daniel R. Fischel, The Economics of Lender Liability, 99 YALE L.J. 131, 138
(1989).
141. Jonathan C. Lipson, Controlling Creditor Opportunism, 9 (Univ. of Wisconsin
Legal
Studies
Research
Paper
No.
1129,
2010),
available
at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1662127.
142. Jan Mahrt-Smith, Should Banks Own Equity Stakes in Their Borrowers? A
Contractual Solution to Hold-up Problems, 30 J. BANK. FIN. 2911 (2006).
143. Gary Gorton & James Kahn, The Design of Bank Loan Contracts, 13 REV. FIN.
STUD. 331, 340 (2000).
144. Raghuram G. Rajan, Insiders and Outsiders: The Choice between Informed and
Arm’s-length Debt, 47 J. FIN. 1367 (1992).
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opportunism because the use of collateral exacerbates the hold-up
problem. 145 Specific aspects of asset-based lender opportunism are
discussed in Section IV.C.
III. ASSET-BASED LENDING
This Section focuses on a unique type of performance-sensitive debt
in the form of asset-based loans. It builds upon the previous Sections by
analyzing the real-word application of a loan that utilizes several of the
creditor governance mechanisms of performance-sensitive debt analyzed in
Section I; namely, monitoring and screening, performance pricing, lines of
credit, and collateral-based finance in the form of a borrowing base. Assetbased loans embody many of the principles identified in Section II
regarding the efficiency of performance-sensitive loans: asset-based loan
structures reduce agency costs by disciplining borrowers and providing a
constant flow of information to lenders. The use of asset-based loans is
also consistent with the general principle of financial law that loans with
strong protections for creditors are uniquely available to high-risk
borrowers.
A. Basic Structure
Asset-based lending is a type of debt finance that involves making a
revolving line of credit available to a borrower based on the value of its
assets. 146 It is performance sensitive because any particular time the
amount of funds made available to a borrower (i.e., the size of the credit
facility) may change depending on the performance of the collateral in the
borrower’s borrowing base. If the value of the collateral increases,
additional funds will be made available to the borrower, and vice versa.
Consistent with what is predicted by theories of creditor monitoring, 147
asset-based lending takes the form of a senior, secured loan. An assetbased lender has first priority recourse to collateral if the borrower cannot
satisfy its debt obligation. 148 However, in a typical secured loan, which is
145. See infra, Section I.E.
146. A line of credit is revolving, meaning the amount of outstanding funds actually
used by the borrower (the borrower’s balance) increases or decreases over time depending
on whether an advance is made to the borrower or the borrower pays down a portion of the
loan balance. GE CAPITAL, GUIDE TO ASSET BASED LENDING 9 (1999),
http://www.gelending.com/Clg/Resources/PDF/guide/asset_guide.pdf; ROBERT T. SLEE,
PRIVATE CAPITAL MARKETS: VALUATION, CAPITALIZATION, AND TRANSFER OF PRIVATE
BUSINESS INTERESTS 315 (2011) [hereinafter Slee].
147. See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
148. Slee, supra note 146.
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non-asset-based, the primary determinant of the size and terms of a loan are
the cash flows and overall financial strength of the borrower at the entitylevel, and collateral is only resorted to for repayment as a last resort. By
contrast, asset-based lending is different than typical secured loans due to
the additional prominence played by collateral. In an asset-based loan, the
value of the collateral determines the size of the loan and the collateral is
the primary source of repayment. 149
The asset-based loan industry consists of a three-tier structure
differentiated by the level of risk the lenders are willing take on and the
size of the loans they make. Lenders in the first tier consist of asset-based
lending divisions of major commercial banks.150 They generally make
loans of $15 million and larger to the most stable borrowers and charge an
interest rate at two percent above the prime rate.151 Second or mid-tier
asset-based lenders generally make loans of $3 to $15 million at an interest
rate of the prime rate plus four percent. 152 Finally, third tier asset-based
lenders generally make loans smaller than $3 million and charge the prime
rate plus 9 percent. 153 Third tier asset-based lenders are comprised of
independent commercial finance companies and are the most concerned
with the liquidation value of the collateral and the least with the earnings of
the borrower; they are even willing to lend to borrowers with a negative
earning capacity. Third tier asset-based lenders have the loosest financial
covenants, engage in the most intense monitoring, and may reserve the
right to call the loan at any time with adequate notice. 154
B. Monitoring in Asset-Based Loans
As discussed in Section I, 155 screening and monitoring are
prerequisites for undertaking performance sensitive lending. For assetbased loans, screening assets and monitoring their value are two defining
aspects of the loan. By contrast, in typical secured (i.e., non-asset-based)
loans, lenders do not engage in the type of intense collateral monitoring as
they do in asset-based lending. In an asset-based loan, the collateral is
screened by lenders before becoming part of the borrowing base and it is
actively monitored after the loan is made. Active monitoring of loan
collateral is consistent with my observation above that performance

149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

GREGORY F. UDELL, ASSET-BASED FINANCE 9-10 (2004) [hereinafter Udell].
Slee, supra note 146, at 322-23.
Id. at 321.
Id. at 327.
Id. at 330.
Id. at 329-30.
See supra Section I.B.1.
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sensitive contracts are likely to include unique mechanisms for information
production. 156 The two primary monitoring-related aspects of asset-based
lending are ex ante availability analysis of collateral and ex post monitoring
and investigation.
1. Collateral Screening
Availability analysis is the process by which the asset-based lender
determines the amount of credit to make available to the borrower after
analyzing the collateral being offered to secure the loan. 157 In valuing the
collateral, an asset-based lender is concerned with the collectability or
liquidation value of the collateral as opposed to its market value. 158
Collateral whose value is uncorrelated with the value of the company as a
whole, and retains its value if the company becomes insolvent, is
particularly attractive to asset-based lenders.
In determining the eligibility of assets to be included in the borrowing
base, the lender will generally seek to exclude any assets that will not result
in cash payment to the borrower or are difficult to liquidate. 159 When
accounts receivable are used as collateral, the eligibility determination
turns on an estimate of the extent to which receivables may be
uncollectable. 160 The discount rate will be lower if the lender is less
concerned with non-collectability (primarily in the form of dilution) and
collection costs. 161 According to Udell, specific factors impacting the
discount rate include macro and local economic conditions, the credit
strength of the borrower’s particular accounts, and the borrower’s gross
profit margin. 162 In general, the liquidation value of receivables is close to

156. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
157. Udell, supra note 149, at 60-61.
158. Berger & Udell, supra note 16, at 313; UPS CAPITAL, GLOBAL ASSET-BASED
LENDING,
FREQUENTLY
ASKED
QUESTIONS,
(2012),
https://www.upscapital.com/solutions/app_docs/GABL-FAQ.pdf [hereinafter UPS Capital];
Practical Law Company, Asset-based Loan Agreement: Borrowing Base Definitions (2013)
(“Asset-based lenders generally value inventory at below market sale prices when
determining the amount of the loans that the inventory can support through the borrowing
base.”), http://us.practicallaw.com/1-502-8687#a542520; Utilizing Contracts as Collateral
in Asset-Based Lending, ACCUVAL, March 2010 (“When using long–term contracts as
collateral, their value should be considered as if they were under distress since that would be
the
most
relevant
value
for
the
lender.”),
http://www.accuval.net/insights/featuredarticle/detail.php?ID=60.
159. Practical Law Company, supra note 87.
160. See also Slee, supra note 146, at 316-17 (describing the characteristics of
receivables that may make them ineligible to be included in the borrowing base).
161. Slee, supra note 146, at 317-18.
162. Udell, supra note 149, at 66.
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their face value and do not substantially diminish in the event of a
company’s insolvency. 163 When inventory is used as collateral, the
eligibility determination turns on whether the inventory being used as
collateral is in the borrower’s possession, is owned free and clear of any
legal encumbrances, and is in a salable condition. 164 The discount rate
applicable to inventory is dependent on the liquidity of the inventory in
question, and the difficulty of valuing the collateral in general and
verifying its value over the life of the loan to ensure the loan-to-collateral
ratio is consistent with the lender’s determination.165
2. Monitoring Covenants and Collateral
Monitoring plays a unique role in asset-based lending because of the
covenants that lenders monitor and the prominence of collateral
monitoring.
Asset-based lending’s unique emphasis on collateral
monitoring is reflected in the financial ratios that asset-based lenders
monitor in contrast to financial statement lenders. Asset-based lenders
focus on ratios that evaluate collateral and not a company’s overall
creditworthiness. Asset-based lenders focus on ratios such as those
measuring a company’s decrease in accounts receivable collections
(dilution) and ratios measuring the quality of its accounts.166 The former
category includes ratios such as the fraction of returned items sold on
account. The latter includes ratios such as the fraction of accounts
receivable over ninety days past due. Importantly, asset-based loans
contain few, if any, financial covenants. 167 By contrast, the ratios focused
on by financial statement lenders include financial covenants typically
expressed in ratios that measure a company’s liquidity, leverage, and
profitability. 168
Monitoring plays a unique role in asset-based lending because
monitoring collateral is particularly intense. In an asset-based loan, the
collateral that is ultimately used to determine the size of the line of credit is

163. Id. at 72.
164. Udell, supra note 149, at 72; Slee, supra note 146, at 318.
165. Udell, supra note 149, at 73.
166. Id. at 9.
167. David Crumbaugh, Are Asset-Based Loans The New Black?, LATHAM & WATKINS
(Sept. 17, 2013), http://www.lw.com/thoughtLeadership/asset-based-loans-middle-marketdeals [hereinafter Crumbaugh] (stating that asset-based loans “are going to be done with
either no financial covenants or a springing financial covenant that only gets tested when
borrowing availability falls below a very small percentage of the revolving loan
commitment”); Kyle Stock, Asset-Based Lending Grows in Popularity, WSJ.COM (Feb. 2,
2010) [hereinafter Stock].
168. Stock, supra note 167.
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known as the borrowing base. Monitoring takes place by borrowers
reporting the value of the borrowing base periodically (or whenever new
funds are requested) in accordance with the agreed upon borrowing base
formula. These reports will also typically include the value of the collateral
underlying the borrowing base. Asset-based lenders typically monitor the
collateral closely to make the largest possible loan under the terms of the
agreement. 169 The nature and frequency of borrowing base and collateral
reports depend on several factors, including the eligible assets, the capacity
of the lender, and how close the borrower is to the maximum borrowing
capacity. 170 Reports can range from daily to monthly. In the case of
monitoring receivables collateral, the lender has daily information
regarding the status of each of the borrower’s receivables. 171 In addition,
assets with a greater price volatility or turnover are subject to more
frequent collateral reporting. 172 Borrowing base reports are reported using
a form borrowing base certificate (attached to the loan agreement as an
exhibit). Borrowing base reporting may be done by fax, email, or through
an electronic platform. Typically, independent nonbank commercial
lenders are better borrowing base monitors than banks.173
The following is an example of a typical borrowing base certificate. It
provides information to the lender about how much the borrowing base is
worth and therefore the size of the borrower’s credit line. 174

169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

Practical Law Company, supra note 87.
Id.
Berger & Udell, supra note 16, at 312.
Practical Law Company, supra note 87.
Id.
Slee, supra note 146, at 317.
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The value of the borrowing base must be periodically re-determined to
account for fluctuating values of the eligible assets. In particular, to
prevent the size of loan from remaining constant while the value of the
eligible assets declines, the lender will engage in periodic monitoring
through appraisals of the assets. 175 The appraisals are typically carried out
by an independent appraiser or engineer.176 And to prevent fraud, the
lender will also hire a third party to engage in periodic field examinations
that confirm the accuracy of the lender’s reports about the borrowing
base. 177 The agreement may also permit the lender to make the changes
without an independent appraisal of how the borrowing base is calculated,;
nonetheless, the lender must carry out borrowing base redeterminations in
good faith. 178

175. Slee, supra note 146, at 317.
176. Id.
177. Steven M. Rosenberg, What is the Purpose of a Lender’s Field Examination?, 59
THE SECURED LENDER, July/August 2003, http://www.rosenbergandfecci.com/wpcontent/uploads/2011/09/jul03_pg044.pdf; UPS Capital, supra note 158.
178. UPS Capital, supra note 158.
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C. Performance Sensitivity Through a Borrowing Base
As discussed in Section I, 179 ex ante performance sensitivity includes
the terms of a loan changing based upon the value of the borrower’s
collateral. Asset-based loans are performance sensitive because the amount
of credit available is based upon the value of its collateral. The specific
contractual provision that keeps the size of the loan proportional to the
value of the collateral is known as the borrowing base.
1. The Borrowing Base Provision
A borrowing base is a contract feature that determines the amount of
credit available to a borrower according to the value of certain assets. At
any particular time, the amount of funds available to a borrower under a
given line of credit depends on the value of the borrower’s borrowing
base, 180 thereby making credit available dependent on the performance of
the borrowing base, and hence performance sensitive. The value of a
borrowing base is determined by the value of assets eligible to be used as
collateral and a discount rate applied to the borrowing base (the advance
rate) to provide the lender a cushion for unforeseeable problems and other
costs. This discount rate is known as the advance rate and it is the
percentage of the value of the eligible assets that constitute the size of the
loan (and any letters of credit). 181 Assets perceived to generate more cash,
or that are easier to liquidate, will receive a higher advance rate.182 For
example, accounts receivable typically receive a higher advance rate than
inventory. The advance rate is typically between 70 and 85 percent for
accounts receivable and between 50 and 65 percent for inventory. 183 The
advance rate will always be less than 100 percent, meaning that an assetbased loan will be overcollateralized in the sense of the loan amount being

179. See supra Section I.B.3.ii.
180. See Robert. A. Modansky, Asset-Based Financing Basics, J. ACCOUNTANCY, Aug.
2011 (“As the borrower manufactures or acquires new inventory, and as it generates
receivables from sales, these new assets become available for inclusion in the borrowing
base.”), http://www.journalofaccountancy.com/issues/2011/aug/20113992; Latham &
Watkins, Book of Jargon: US Corporate and Bank Finance, Asset-Based Loan,
http://www.lw.com/bookofjargon-apps/boj-us-corporate-and-bank-finance (defining an
asset-based loan as “a Revolving Facility where the total amount that can be borrowed
fluctuates based upon the value of certain assets of the Borrower at a given time”) (emphasis
added).
181. Practical Law Company, supra note 87.
182. Id.
183. Id.; Slee, supra note 146, at 318-19. The principal owners of an asset-based
borrower may also offer a personal guarantee or pledge personal assets to support the loan.
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less than the market value of the borrowing base assets.
The amount of the loan relative to value of the eligible assets is also
typically further reduced by the borrower setting aside a reserve.
Agreements typically give wide discretion to lenders to require reserves.184
One reason why the borrower may be required to set aside a reserve is
because of the higher cost of monitoring certain assets. 185 The definition of
the borrowing base is typically heavily negotiated and dependent on the
particular circumstances of the parties such as relative bargaining power
and industry norms. 186 Although inventory, accounts receivable, and
equipment are the types of assets traditionally included in an asset-based
loan’s borrowing base, in principle any type of asset can be included.
2. Borrowing Base Definitions
By examining how borrowing base provisions are drafted, 187 I have
identified several different methods by which a borrowing base can
establish the size of a loan and keep it in proportion to the value of the
assets. Performance sensitivity is a function of how relevant contract
language is drafted.
A straightforward way is to define a borrowing base is as a percentage
of eligible assets. The following are three examples:
“Borrowing Base means an amount equal to eighty percent (80%) of
Eligible Accounts, as determined by Lenders with reference to the most
recent Borrowing Base Certificate delivered by Parent.” 188
“Borrowing Base means, as of any date of calculation, an amount, as
set forth on the most current Borrowing Base Certificate delivered to the
Administrative Agent, equal to 85% of Eligible Receivables as of such
date.” 189
“Borrowing Base: at any time, an amount equal to the sum of (a)

184. Slee, supra note 146, at 318-19.
185. Id.
186. See Elizabeth Goldberg, Facing Down Ford, AM. LAWYER, April 2007,
http://www.weil.com/wgm/cwgmhomep.nsf/Files/DokosDofY/$file/DokosDofY.pdf
(detailing the process of negotiating the terms of a loan to Ford given by J.P. Morgan,
Citigroup, and Goldman Sachs).
187. I reviewed a random sample of 100 borrowing base provisions located in publicly
filed loans on SEC Form 8-K.
188. Careview Commc’ns, Inc., Loan and Security Agreement (Aug. 31, 2011),
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1377149/000138713111001976/ex-10_81.htm.
189. Roadrunner Transp. Sys., Inc., Second Amended and Restated Credit Agreement
(Aug.
31
2011),
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1440024/000095012311082711/c22186exv10w10.
htm.
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eighty-five percent (85%) of all Eligible Accounts Receivable of the
Borrower and its Subsidiaries, plus (b) sixty percent (60%) of all Eligible
Inventory of the Borrower and its Subsidiaries, valued in accordance with
GAAP.” 190
The borrowing base definition may also give the lender or the
administrative agent significant discretion to reduce the credit available to
the borrower by reducing the advance rate percentage. For example:
“Borrowing Base” is eighty percent (80.0%) of Eligible Accounts,
as determined by Bank from Borrower’s most recent Borrowing
Base Certificate; provided, however, that Bank may decrease the
foregoing percentage in its good faith business judgment based on
events, conditions, contingencies, or risks which, as determined
by Bank, may adversely affect Collateral. 191
In addition to reducing the amount of the loan, discretion may also be
extended to increasing the amount of required reserves or narrowing the
scope of eligible assets. For example:
Notwithstanding anything to the contrary herein, the
Administrative Agent may, in its Permitted Discretion, or shall at
the direction of the Required Lenders in their commercially
reasonable discretion, at any time hereafter, decrease the advance
percentage for Qualified Accounts and Qualified Inventory, or
increase the level of any reserves or ineligibles, or define or
maintain such other reserves or ineligibles, as the Administrative
Agent or Required Lenders, as applicable, may deem necessary
or appropriate. 192
A reduction in loan size is also responsive to ex post monitoring in the
form of field audits, examinations, and appraisals. 193 In some asset-based

190. New Enter. Stone & Lime Co., Inc., Second Amended and Restated Credit
Agreement
(Jan.
11,
2008),
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1527032/000104746911007722/a2204980zex10_2.htm.
191. Demandware, Inc., Loan and Security Agreement (July 18, 2008) (emphasis
removed),
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1301031/000119312511189260/dex1018.htm.
192. Universal Stainless and Alloy Products., Inc., Credit Agreement (Aug. 18, 2011),
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/931584/000119312511230804/dex101.htm.
193. See, e.g., New York & Co., Inc., Third Amended and Restated Loan and Security
Agreement
6
(Aug.
10,
2011),
http://yahoo.brand.edgar
online.com/EFX_dll/EDGARpro.dll?FetchFilingHTML1?ID=8139753&SessionID=-
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loans, failure to furnish a borrowing base certificate will automatically
cause the loan amount to be reduced to one dollar.194
D. Asset-Based Lending and Creditor Governance
Asset-based lending combines several fundamental creditor
governance devices: strong monitoring, performance pricing, 195 lines of
credit, and collateral-based finance in the form of a borrowing base.
Combining these governance devices significantly reduces the agency costs
of debt that arise from informational asymmetries.196 Asset-based lending
addresses the problems of adverse selection and moral hazard. For
example, asset-based lending can prevent borrowers from increasing their
risk profile after a loan is made (asset substitution): asset-based lenders
monitor borrower collateral on an ongoing basis and are able to quickly
intervene to prevent a borrower from engaging in undesired activities,
especially when the borrower’s financial condition deteriorates and it has a
greater incentive to increase its risk taking. Alan and Guar argue that assetbased lending helps to reduce a lender’s exposure to a borrower’s risk of
bankruptcy by setting an upper limit on a lender’s potential losses.197
Consistent with creditor governance devices being substitutes, asset-based
lenders are generally more willing to accept fewer (or looser) covenants
and personal guarantees because, compared to typical secured lenders,
asset-based lenders intensely monitor and overcollateralize their
exposures, 198 and also protect themselves with performance sensitivity.199
Indeed, asset-based lenders are often willing to make loans with no
financial covenants at all because they can rely on other governance

XKpFHhUWjxwJX7 (“Agent shall have the right to revise the advance rates in, establish
Reserves against or sublimits in the Borrowing Base in such amounts and with respect to
such matters as Agent in its good faith discretion shall deem necessary or appropriate, at all
times and after Agent has completed its updated field audits, examinations and appraisals of
the Collateral”).
194. Reg Marketing & Logistics Grp., LLC, Revolving Credit Agreement 5 (April 8,
2010),
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1463258/000119312511243548/dex1021.htm
(“[T]he Borrowing Base shall be reduced to one Dollar ($1.00) during any period when the
Borrowers have failed to furnish any computation of the Borrowing Base required hereby”).
195. Asset-based loans typically have performance pricing provisions.
196. See Udell, supra note 149, at 14-20 (discussing different mechanisms used by
lenders to reduce their risk in asset-based financing).
197. Yasin Alan & Vishal Gaur, Operational Investment and Capital Structure Under
Asset Based Lending (Johnson Sch. Research Paper Series, 2012), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1716925.
198. Slee, supra note 146, at 315.
199. Id.
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devices to substitute for such covenants.
An important outcome of the strong creditor governance devices
employed in asset-based loans and the tradeoffs they make possible is that
the loans make credit more widely available and at a lower cost to
borrowers that otherwise would not qualify for a loan. 200 First, because a
potential borrower may be weak from the standpoint of ratios used to
determine whether a traditional financial statement loan would be made yet
nonetheless have particular assets that are strong when viewed as potential
collateral for an asset-based loan, a borrower that lacks general
creditworthiness characteristics may nonetheless still be able to obtain an
asset-based loan due to the quality of its collateral. For example, a
company that is highly leveraged may nonetheless be able to obtain an
asset-based loan if it nonetheless is able to generate substantial cash flows
through high turnover in its accounts receivables or inventory. Asset-based
lenders’ lack of concern about the borrower’s success as an enterprise
explains why they are willing to make loans to riskier companies.201 Assetbased lending as a form of intermediation is therefore, in part, a response to
borrowers’ inability to signal their quality to lenders through traditional
financial measures.
Asset-based loans also often have a lower interest rate than
comparable loans. 202 This is in accordance with my claim that creditor
governance devices are tradeoffs such that strong devices in the form of
security, monitoring, and performance sensitivity mean that a creditor does
not need the additional governance device of a high interest rate.
Furthermore, because an asset-based loan is generally structured as a
revolving credit facility, it may also reduce a borrower’s interest rate
because the borrower only pays interest on the amount used and can use
any unused borrowings to pay down the loan.203 Similarly, asset-based
loans give borrowers access to cash more quickly than other types of loans.
In an asset-based loan, cash is made available to the borrower before the
actual collateral supporting the loan generates cash—for example, before
receivables are collected or inventory is sold.204 Asset-based lenders are

200. Id.
201. See Udell, supra note 149, at 9 (detailing the rationale behind the lending behaviors
of asset-based lenders).
202. See Schwimmer, supra note 25 (providing background information on the general
practice of asset-based lending).
203. See GE CAPITAL, GUIDE TO ASSET BASED LENDING 10 (1999),
http://www.gelending.com/Clg/Resources/PDF/guide/asset_guide.pdf (noting that revolving
loans are generally more cost-effective in financing relatively short-term projects whereas
term loans are the same for longer projects).
204. See id. at 10. Asset-based loans serve the purpose of converting assets to cash
faster than their usual business cycle. Id. at 10, 15.
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willing to advance cash because even at that stage in the loan process they
will have already benefitted from strong governance in the form of
screening the collateral and limiting the amount of credit to be less than the
collateral’s liquidation value.
IV. ASSET-BASED STARTUP FINANCING
The prior Sections of this Article suggest that performance-senstive
loans are generally more efficient in the context of high-risk borrowers, and
that asset-based loans in particular reduce the agency costs borne by
lenders due to their unique combination of strong creditor governance
devices. Building on those insights, this Section argues that asset-based
loans have the potential to provide more financing to a particular type of
high-risk borrower with high agency costs, namely, revenue-stage startups.
This is because asset-based loans are often cheaper than other sources of
capital and more borrower-friendly than other types of debt. In addition,
because asset-based loans can be structured to meet the needs of a wide
variety of borrowers, they are likely also able to meet the needs of certain
high-tech startups with intellectual property assets. Accordingly, certain
types of startups may be missing out on an important source of capital.
A. Background
1. Startup Financing and Asset-Based Lending
Startups cannot raise capital as easily as large or established
companies. This is in part due to a lack of revenues. A 2011 survey found
that 55 percent of eight-year-old startups had annual revenues under
$100,000, and only 13 percent were over $1 million.205 Startups are also
generally more risky than larger, more established firms due to their
relative informational opaqueness and greater incentive to shift risk to
creditors. 206
Nonetheless, numerous external funding sources are available to
startups, including various types of equity and debt. 207 Startup financing
generally takes place in several stages. The earliest stage consists of a prerevenue phase where the primary sources of capital come from the founders

205. Alicia Robb & Joseph Farhat, An Overview of the Kauffman Firm Survey: Results
from
2011
Business
Activities
4,
(June
2013),
available
at:
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=227764 [hereinafter Robb & Farhat].
206. Berger & Udell, supra note 16, at 300.
207. Issuing public bonds are a type of financing generally unavailable to startups due to
their lack of established track records and the costs of underwriting a bond deal.
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themselves, friends, family, and credit cards. A second stage is the
seed/early stage for companies that are earning revenues, and where the
primary source of funds is from angel investors or specialist funds for less
than $5 million. For companies that are (or will likely be) profitable and
that want to expand, they usually progress to a third stage and obtain
capital in the $5 million to $10 million range. 208 In these stages, startups
that obtain outside equity overwhelmingly do so from angel investors.209 In
recent years, angel investors provided about $20 billion to over 60,000
startups annually with a median deal size ranging from $590,000 to
$700,000. 210 Two additional startup financing stages are the “late stage”
for consistently profitable companies seeking $10 million or more of
capital, and a subsequent stage for companies that may be ready for a
buyout or even an initial public offering of securities.211
In terms of debt financing, 75 percent of startups obtain external debt
in the form of business or trade credit, with credit card debt being the
largest source. 212 External debt makes up the largest source of capital for
startups during their first year.213 Credit lines make up about 15 percent of
startup capital and term loans constitute another seven percent.214 Most
loans to startups are small: in any given year, only about 10 percent of
startup loans are $100,000 or greater in size.215 In 2011, 13.5 percent of
loans to startups required some form of collateral.216
For the relatively few startups that receive equity venture capital,217

208. MADISON PARK GRP., GUIDE TO VENTURE CAPITAL 3 (detailing the stages of
venture capital growth), http://madisonparkgrp.com/pdf/gtvc.pdf [hereinafter MADISON
PARK GRP.]
209. See ACA, Angel Groups, and Angel-Backed Companies, ANGEL CAPITAL ASS’N 16
(2012) (graphing the comparison of venture capital to angel investors),
http://www.angelcapitalassociation.org/data/Documents/Resources/ACAandAngelGroupBa
ckground09-12.pdf.
210. See Halo Report Angel Group Update: Q2, SILICON VALLEY BANK 6 (2013)
(providing information on the average amounts of angel investments),
http://www.svb.com/uploadedFiles/Content/Blogs/Halo_Report/halo-report-q2-2013.pdf.
211. MADISON PARK GRP., supra note 208 at 3.
212. Rebel Cole & Tatyana Sokolyk, How Do Start-Up Firms Finance Their Assets?
Evidence from the Kauffman Firm Surveys 38 (Working Paper, 2013), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2028176.
213. Alicia M. Robb & David T. Robinson, The Capital Structure Decisions of New
Firms, REV. FIN. STUD. 14 (2012) (explaining how outside debt is the largest funding source
for start-ups).
214. Id.
215. Robb & Farhat, supra note 205, at 6.
216. Id. at 5.
217. Diane Mulcahy, Six Myths About Venture Capitalists, HARV. BUS. REV., May 2013
(“Historically, only a tiny percentage (fewer than 1%) of U.S. companies have raised capital
from VCs”), http://hbr.org/2013/05/six-myths-about-venture-capitalists/ar/1.
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one type of loan that is available is venture debt. Venture debt is a loan
provided to a company that is already backed by equity venture capital, or
alongside an infusion of venture capital.218 An estimated two-thirds to
three-quarters of venture-backed startups use some form of debt; 219 and on
average debt makes up about a third of their capital structure. 220 From the
beginning of 2012 through the first half of 2013, an estimated 450 venturebacked startups obtained $3.1 billion in venture debt with an average loan
size of $7.1 million. During that time, venture debt accounted for just
under 8 percent of the capital invested in startups.221 Venture debt takes the
form of a senior secured term loan that has no financial covenants.222 It is
sold with warrants ranging from five to 15 percent of the loan amount. 223
The interest rate on venture debt varies based on the risk of the borrower
and other terms of the deal, 224 and can range from two to 20 percent above
the prime rate. 225 Venture debt is typically used for growth or as a bridge
between equity financing rounds. 226 In 2012, $26.5 billion of equity
venture capital financing took place across 3698 deals. 227
In addition to venture debt, asset-based loans can also provide debt
financing for startups. When used to fund a startup, an asset-based loan is
typically available only to companies that are earning revenues, and it is
collateralized by accounts receivable, inventory, or purchase orders from
218. Robb & Farhat, supra note 205, at 3-4.
219. Darian M. Ibrahim, Debt as Venture Capital, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1169, 1177
(2010) [hereinafter Ibrahim].
220. Berger & Udell, supra note 16, at 299.
221. NXT Capital Launches Venture Debt Index, BUSINESS WIRE (Nov. 7, 2013),
http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20131107005202/en/NXT-Capital-LaunchesVenture-Debt-Index#.U08YNvldX00.
222. LEADER
VENTURES,
Venture
Debt
Overview
at
5,
http://leaderventures.com/overview.pdf [hereinafter LEADER VENTURES].
223. Ibrahim, supra note 219, at 1179.
224. SILICON VALLEY BANK, Venture Debt–Maximizing its Value in The Current
Environment at 9 (2004), http://www.sandhill.com/conferences/pdf/software04_014.pdf
[hereinafter Silicon Valley Bank].
225. See, Raghavan Anand, Is Venture Debt on the Rise?, REUTERS PEHUB (June 3,
2013) (stating that venture debt “[i]nterest rates are often low, a couple of percentage points
above prime rate”), www.pehub.com/2013/06/is-venture-debt-on-the-rise/; BESSEMER
VENTURE PARTNERS, Venture Debt Analysis, (2009) (noting a 14 percent interest rate for an
illustrative
company’s
venture
debt),
http://www.jasonnazar.com/wpcontent/uploads/2008/11/venture-debt-analysis1.pdf; Ibrahim, supra note 219, at 1182.
226. BRITISH PRIVATE EQUITY AND VENTURE CAPITAL ASS’N & WINSTON AND STRAWN,
The Rise of Venture Debt in Europe at 8 (May 2010), available at http://thebln.com/wpcontent/uploads/2010/05/The-Rise-of-Venture-Debt-in-Europe1.pdf.
227. Leena Rao, VCs Invested $26.5B In 3,698 Companies In 2012, Total Dollars And
Deal
Volume
Both
Down,
TECHCRUNCH
(Jan.
17,
2013),
http://techcrunch.com/2013/01/17/vcs-invested-26-5b-in-3698-companies-in-2012-totaldollars-and-deal-volume-both-down/.
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the startup’s customers. A typical structure takes the form of a 12-month,
interest-only revolving line of credit secured by a first priority lien on all
assets. The nature and extent of any financial covenants will depend on
pricing and how much control the lender has over the assets.228
2. Including Intellectual Property in a Borrowing Base
For technology (tech) startups, intellectual property (IP) makes up a
relatively significant portion of their assets. A survey of startups from
2004 to 2008 found that 11.2 percent owned patents, 19.5 percent owned
copyrights, and 22.1 percent owned trademarks. 229
Although uncommon, IP can be used as loan collateral and is a wellrecognized type of legally enforceable security interest. 230 Securing a loan
with IP assets presents unique risks relative to using tangible assets. These
risks arise primarily from properly valuing the IP and the complexity of
providing legal protection and security. 231 Valuation challenges arise from
228. Silicon Valley Bank, supra note 224, at 10.
229. ALICIA ROBB ET AL., KAUFFMAN FOUND., AN OVERVIEW OF THE KAUFFMAN FIRM
SURVEY:
RESULTS
FROM
THE
2004–2008
DATA,
(2010)
14,
http://www.kauffman.org/~/media/kauffman_org/research%20reports%20and%20covers/20
10/05/kfs_2010_report.pdf. For an overview of policy issues regarding patents, see Kirti
Gupta, The Patent Policy Debate in the High-Tech World: A Literature Review, (Working
Paper,
2013),
available
at
https://www.law.northwestern.edu/researchfaculty/searlecenter/workingpapers/documents/Gupta_patent-policy-debate-literaturereview.pdf.
230. Maria Loumioti, The Use of Intangible Assets as Loan Collateral (Working Paper),
2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1748675 [hereinafter
Loumioti] (“I find that twenty-one percent of U.S.-originated secured loans from 19962005” have been collateralized by intangibles); Gaétan de Rassenfosse, How SMEs Exploit
their Intellectual Property Assets: Evidence from Survey Data, (Intellectual Prop. Research
Inst. of Austl., Working Paper No. 8/10, ISSN 1447-2317, 2010), available at
http://www.ipria.net/publications/wp/2010/Working%20Paper%208_2010.pdf (“a survey of
about 50 European commercial banks found none that routinely accept intangible assets as
collateral for loans to new technology-based firms”); Anjanette Raymond, Intellectual
Property as Collateral in Secured Transactions: Collision of Divergent Approaches, 10
BUS. L. INT’L. 27, 32-33 (2009) [hereinafter Raymond].
231. Darin Neumyer, Future of Using Intellectual Property and Intangible Assets As
Collateral, THE SECURED LENDER, Jan/Feb 2008, at 45, available at
https://cfa.com/eWeb/docs/tsl_archives_pdf/jan08_pg042.pdf [hereinafter Neumyer]; Ian
Ellis, Maximizing Intellectual Property and Intangible Assets, 4-5 (Athena Alliance,
Working
Paper
No.
07,
2009),
available
at
http://www.athenaalliance.org/pdf/MaximizingIntellectualPropertyandIntangibleAssets.pdf
[hereinafter Ellis]; See also Bruce W. Barton et al., Have IP Assets, Need Money!, The
Role of IP Valuation in Startup Investment, STOUT, RISIUS, ROSS, 2013, available at
http://www.srr.com/assets/pdf/role-ip-valuation-startup-investment.pdf (discussing the
importance of IP assets in securing financing, types of financing, valuation methodologies,
and why valuation is important).
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the difficulty of estimating the extent to which the market will accept new
products and the obsolescence of technology and brands. 232 When lenders
attempt to value IP for the purposes of securing a loan, they are generally
concerned with the value of the IP under a distressed sale scenario and not
its value as part of a larger operating company. 233 Legal risks include
ownership challenges (infringement) and the expiration of IP rights. 234 In
addition, there is uncertainty regarding the interaction between how federal
law and the Uniform Commercial Code govern security interests in
patents. 235
When IP is used as collateral, it is typically the type of IP that
generates income from patent or trademark licenses or copyright
royalties. 236 Startups tend to license out a greater portion of their patents
than more mature firms. 237 IP is also typically only valuable to firms for
obtaining financing after the company is already generating revenues, but
not before. 238
IP may be used independently to secure a loan or lumped in together
with the borrower’s other, tangible assets. 239 In terms of general structures,
a lender may have a security interest in the IP or own it outright and lease it
back to the borrower. 240 If the lender has an enforceable security interest in

232. Neumyer, supra note 231, at 45.
233. Leveraged IP, IP INVESTOR, Dec. 2006, at 24, available at
https://files.nyu.edu/djk244/public/12Loans.pdf (“Middle-stage companies . . . usually have
an IP portfolio that has been proven, and there is more certainty that the IP has value and
can be sold if the company defaults on the loan.”).
234. Neumyer, supra note 231, at 45. Other difficulties inherent to using IP as collateral
include structuring issues, prioritization, registration issues, and not being categorized as
after-acquired property. Raymond, supra note 230, at 45-50.
235. Alicia G. Mills, Perfecting Security Interests in IP: Avoiding the Traps, 128
BANKING L. J. 746 (2008), available at http://www.dorsey.com/files/Publication/7c9a4920e4c6-4011-8811-05313de35e9f/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/189f4db8-692e-4223a0e1-33785fd8d0f0/mills.pdf.
236. Id. at 9.
237. Gaétan de Rassenfosse, How SMEs Exploit Their Intellectual Property Assets:
Evidence from Survey Data, (Melbourne Inst., Working Paper Series, Working Paper No.
20/10)
available
at
http://melbourneinstitute.com/downloads/working_paper_series/wp2010n20.pdf.
238. See Ronald J. Mann & Thomas W. Sager, Patents, Venture Capital, and Software
Start-ups, 36 RES. POL. 193, 194, 206 (2007) (introducing author’s quantitative analysis of
the role of patents for pre-revenue and later-stage startups).
239. Id. at 14-15; Leveraged IP, IP INVESTOR, Dec. 2006, at 24, available at
https://files.nyu.edu/djk244/public/12Loans.pdf [hereinafter IP INVESTOR] (“This leads to
the heart of the problem with IP collateral lending: How does one value something with no
proven value? This conundrum has historically made most lenders wary of this type of
lending.”).
240. Steven J. Henry, Neil P. Ferraro & Hunter Keeton, Securing a Loan with Patents,
Trademarks, and Copyrights is Best for Lenders, 6 J. BANK. L., (Jan. 2010).
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the IP, the lender can typically seize and sell the IP if the borrower defaults
or otherwise fails in its obligations.241 If the lender owns the asset outright
through an assignment by the borrower, the lender does not have to be
concerned with having a legal right to sell the IP upon borrower default. 242
When a security interest is granted in IP that produces a revenue stream,
the IP asset is pledged as collateral and the loan is paid down by the
revenue that it generates (as opposed to the revenue generated by the
company). 243
Although rare, IP may be a primary source of collateral as opposed to
merely being a secondary, back-up source (a credit enhancer). 244 IP assets
may be used to make longer-term loans if the lender views a new round of
equity as their primary method of repayment instead of the company’s cash
flows—a situation likely for certain startups. In a sale-leaseback structure,
the lender takes a hands-off approach towards managing the IP and only
controls it if the borrower defaults. 245 An alternative to the sale-leaseback
structure is for the borrower to keep ownership of the IP but promise (in a
negative pledge clause) to not pledge the asset to any other creditor.246
Borrowers are often reluctant to assign away or permit a lender to take a
lien in their IP. 247
In an asset-based loan, IP can serve the role of a credit enhancer by
being included in the pool of assets that serve as collateral, even though the
IP is not part of the borrowing base. 248 Another structure that incorporates
IP with an asset-based loan is a “split” or “bifurcated collateral”
transaction. This type of deal consists of an asset-based loan with a first
lien on assets in the borrowing base combined with a term loan with a first
lien term loan in the borrower’s IP. 249 For example:

241. Id.
242. However, owning the IP asset outright may impair its value to the lender, and
hence undermine its value as collateral, because the lender may be impaired in its ability to
seek damages for infringement, fail in its responsibility to maintain proper records and fees,
and other reasons. Id.
243. Ellis, supra note 231, at 4.
244. IP INVESTOR, supra note 239.
245. Id. at 22-23.
246. Id. at 23.
247. Id. at 23-24. Practitioners claim that using IP as collateral makes the most sense for
middle stage companies and is significantly riskier for startups. Id. at 24 (“Middle-stage
companies . . . usually have an IP portfolio that has been proven, and there is more certainty
that the IP has value and can be sold if the company defaults on the loan.”).
248. Marie Leon, Collateral Salvage, CFO.COM (June 2, 2005).
249. Done Deal: Junior Capital’s Role in Debt Financing, THE SECURED LENDER, Aug.
12,
2012,
available
at
http://crystalfinco.com/files/3713/4523/4116/August_2012_Roundtable_Discussion_Secure
d_Lender.pdf [hereinafter Done Deal: Junior Capital’s Role in Debt Financing]; Steven
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[I]n one such transaction, an equity firm purchased an apparel
company in October 2011 with the intent of restructuring the
European operations. The capital structure included a $30
million revolver secured by inventory and accounts receivables
and a $12.5 million term loan provided by Crystal [Financial] that
was secured by a first lien on the intellectual property (in this
case the brand) . . . [and] on all the non-working capital
assets . . . . 250
In such a structure, the lenders may also each take a second lien
position in the other lender’s primary collateral.251
But beyond simply being used as collateral in an ordinary secured
loan, IP may also be included as part of an asset-based loan’s borrowing
base. 252 When IP is included in a borrowing base, it is valued according to
the same advance rate methodology as traditional, tangible assets in an
asset-based loan. 253 Including IP in a borrowing base along with more
traditional assets can increase the amount of credit available to the
borrower. 254 This is typically the case for companies that are at least

Migliero, Recent Trends in Asset-Based Lending — Understanding the History of ABL Can
Reap Benefits, ABF J. (Sept. 2012), http://www.abfjournal.com/articles/recent-trends-inasset-based-lending-understanding-the-history-of-abl-can-reap-benefits/.
250. Steven Migliero, Getting to Yes When Banks Say No - Bifurcated Collateral Loans
Provide
Incremental
Liquidity,
ABF
J.,
(Sept.
2012),
http://www.abfjournal.com/articles/getting-to-yes-when-banks-say-no-bifurcated-collateralloans-provide-incremental-liquidity/.
251. Id.
252. For considerations in lending against trade names and patents, see Neumyer, supra
note 231, at 45-47; Gerald Sherman et al., Consumer Brands as Collateral: Opportunities
for
Asset-Based
Lenders,
COMM.
LENDING
REV.,
(Nov.-Dec.
2009),
http://www.northstarmp.com/pdf/Consumer%20Brands.pdf (looking at the value of
consumer brands).
253. Neumyer, supra note 231, at 48.
254. Marie Leon, Collateral Salvage, CFO.COM, (June 2, 2005) (“as early as 2001, Levi
Strauss & Co. . . . directly arranged for $1.05 billion asset-based loan that used ‘a package
of trademarks’ as well as hard assets”); John R. Hermann, Two Approaches to Financing
Software
at
5,
available
at
http://www.iiiglobal.org/component/jdownloads/finish/337/4030.html (“Occasionally, the
Lender will include some of the value of a borrower’s intellectual property in the borrowing
base, almost always in connection with a loan that is collateralized by the substantial
majority of the borrower’s other assets.”); Mario Ippolito et al., Certainty of Execution:
Asset-Based Lending in Leveraged Finance, 11 ABF J. 2, (May/June 2013), available at
http://www.paulhastings.com/Resources/Upload/Publications/Certainty_of_Execution__Asset-Based_Lending_in_Leveraged_Finance.pdf. (“The borrowing base collateral . . .
may . . . include . . . intellectual property.”).
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somewhat established or if the IP is relatively easy to value.255 Consistent
with my analysis of monitoring costs and performance sensitivity, 256 adding
IP to the borrowing base has the potential to increase a lender’s profits
despite having higher monitoring costs. 257 Venture lenders and other
nonbank lenders are much more likely to include IP in a borrowing base
than banks. 258
B. Why Startups Should Seek Asset-Based Loans
1. Company-Friendly Financing
Several aspects of asset-based loans indicate that startups should
increasingly seek them out. First, obtaining capital through a loan is often
better for a startup than equity financing. Debt is beneficial to startups that
want to grow without giving up control rights, rights to profits, or suffering
other aspects of equity dilution that result from selling stock. Taking on
debt is also beneficial for companies that want to avoid raising equity
during a down round of financing—when their equity is valued lower than
what the previous venture capital investors paid.259 Although obtaining
capital through a loan requires a company to pay a fixed interest rate (and
other fees), in circumstances often applicable to startups the net cost of a
loan relative to equity is lower. For example, a startup that grows 25
percent over two years may have a higher return (to its current equity
investors) if it finances that growth with a loan rather than additional
equity. 260 An asset-based loan in particular may be cheaper than raising
funds with equity. This is because the revolver structure of asset-based
loans minimizes the interest payments to such an extent that it is even
cheaper relative to equity than other forms of debt.261
For startups that may otherwise obtain venture debt, there are several

255. Asset
Based
Lending,
COMMERCIAL
FINANCE
PARTNERS,
http://commercialfinancepartners.com/Asset_based_lending.html (“Intellectual property can
be considered as part of an asset based lending facility, however, only for companies that
have a proven track history and recognizable brand that has value in itself.”).
256. See Kamphol, supra notes 96 and accompanying text.
257. Capturing the Value of Intellectual Property for Leveraged Finance
Considerations,
ACCUVAL,
(April
2008),
http://www.accuval.net/insights/featuredarticle/detail.php?ID=36.
258. Id. at 22-23.
259. LEADER VENTURES, supra note 222, at 4.
260. Jan Haas, The Case For Raising a Venture Debt Round, BOSTON BUS. J., June 12,
2013, http://www.bizjournals.com/boston/blog/startups/2013/06/venture-debt-nxt-capitaljan-haas.html?page=all.
261. GE Capital, supra note 203, at 10.
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reasons why asset-based loans may be a superior type of debt. First, the
interest rate on an asset-based loan is typically lower than for a comparable
venture debt agreement.262 The interest rate is lower because asset-based
loans have stronger creditor governance than venture debt. Asset-based
lenders perform more stringent monitoring than venture lenders and have
already performed a thorough screen upfront. In addition, the performance
sensitivity of asset-based loans due to their use of a borrower base and
performance pricing makes it less likely that an asset-based loan overextends credit to a borrower. Finally, because asset-based loans are
structured as a revolving credit facility, they only require the borrower to
pay interest on capital actually drawn down from the facility. Repayment
of loan principal is also more flexible in an asset-based loan. 263 When a
startup has stable revenues, an asset-based loan may also be cheaper than
venture debt if the borrowing base assets produce predictable cash flows.264
A lower interest than other forms of debt is crucial, because startups often
find the requirement to make regular payments to a lender as one of the
most unappealing aspects of taking on debt in any form.
Asset-based loans are also cheaper and generally more attractive than
other types of debt besides venture debt. 265 Asset-based loans have less
stringent covenants and can get capital to borrowers more quickly than
typical secured loans. 266 Asset-based loans typically also do not include
warrants issued to the lender, which dilute the startup owners’ stake in the
company. 267 The lack of financial covenants and focus on company-level
performance may also make an asset-based lender more willing to work
with a company during times of distress. 268 And because the amount of
credit available in an asset-based loan is performance sensitive, it will
increase as the borrowing base grows, thereby saving the borrower from
having to obtain a new loan to keep up with its growth.269
262. LEADER VENTURES, supra note 222, at 5.
263. Id. at 5.
264. Id. at 6.
265. Slee, supra note 146, at 315; Crumbaugh, supra note 167; The Fundamental
Benefits of Today’s Asset-Based Finance, Capital Eyes, BANK OF AMERICA (April 2006),
http://corp.bankofamerica.com/publicpdf/products/abf/0406_FundBenefits_ABL.pdf
[hereinafter Bank of America]; Schwimmer, supra note 25 (“Many of these issuers that
historically have obtained less rigorously monitored, or even unsecured, facilities, are
finding ABL to be cheaper and more flexible.”).
266. See Crumbaugh, supra note 167 and citations therein (explaining execution of
asset-based loans).
267. Crumbaugh, supra note 167 and citations therein.
268. Asset-Based Lending: A Financing Alternative That Fuels Small Business Growth,
TAB
BANK
WHITE
PAPER,
at
2,
available
at
http://go.tabbank.com/rs/tabbank/images/TAB_WhitePaper_ABL.pdf.
269. Financing Alternatives that Support Growth, WELLS FARGO CAPITAL FINANCE,
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2. Industry Momentum
Recent years have seen asset-based loans being adapted for a broader
range of purposes. This suggests that it can be further adapted to finance
various types of startups as well. Traditionally, asset-based lending was
used by high-risk borrowers for working capital. These borrowers typically
included retailers, wholesalers, distributors, and manufacturers because
these types of firms have assets that can most easily serve as collateral
suitable for an asset-based loan. 270 Over time, however, asset-based
lending lost its stigma as a type of loan for low quality borrowers 271 and
became used by a wide variety of small and medium enterprises for a
variety of purposes. 272 Currently, asset-based loans are used for a wide
range of purposes, including: financing working capital and other
expenditure needs, expansion through transactions such as mergers and
leveraged buyouts, and stabilizing troubled companies through turnaround
and debtor-in-posession transactions. 273
Another important dynamic in the asset-based lending industry is
increasing competition among lenders. Increasing competition has
resulted in asset-based lenders expanding the types of borrowers and
industries they are willing to lend to. 274 For example, since entering the
asset-based loan business in 2007, most of On Deck Capital’s loans have
been to companies with revenues of less than $3 million a year.275
Competition has also made the loans much more flexible and borrower
friendly. These include a lower minimum required cushion of value of
assets over debt outstanding (excess availability), a lower threshold of
excess availability for triggering financial covenants, greater collateral
over-advances, and allowing the borrower to pay out dividends.276
Technology is also reducing the costs associated with monitoring a
borrowing base. 277 For example, CADENCE provides software that
(2011), available at http://wellsfargocapitalfinance.com/docs/growth.pdf.
270. GE Capital, supra note 203, at 10.
271. John B. Caouette et al., Asset-Based Lending and Lease Finance, in MANAGING
CREDIT RISK: THE GREAT CHALLENGE FOR GLOBAL FINANCIAL MARKETS 122 (2011); Tim
Reason, Borrowing Big Time, CFO.COM, Nov. 1, 2003; Hugh C. Larratt-Smith, Asset-Based
Lending in Europe Today, THE SECURED LENDER, Sept. 2013, at 16, 19.
272. Crumbaugh, supra note 167 (stating that “[asset-based] loans have gone
mainstream in the last four or five years and as people find more uses for them they are
going to continue to increase in popularity”).
273. Bank of America, supra note 265. See also Slee, supra note 146, at 315.
274. Myra A. Thomas, ABL Goes Mainstream, THE SECURED LENDER, Nov. 2013, at 20.
275. Stock, supra note 167.
276. Schwimmer, supra note 25. These changes have been mitigated to some extent by
increasing advance rates or increasing the fixed charge ratio. Id.
277. See Rishi Kumar, The Hitchhiker’s Guide to Technology for the Commercial
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enables lenders to monitor multiple types of collateral and automatically
screen assets for eligibility, which it claims speeds up the process from
several days to several minutes. 278 Another company, ABLSoft, provides
continuous, Web-based collateral monitoring software. 279 Ftrans also sells
an automated collateral monitoring product and explains its benefits as the
following:
With Ftrans, lenders can adjust advance rates using online
monitoring of automatically generated, risk-adjusted clients’
borrowing bases to decrease exposure and systematically manage
the key risks of extending working capital loans to smaller
businesses. Because acquiring standard loan documentation is
automated, you can comfortably extend your lending footprint
and extend credit to smaller businesses at acceptable rates. Less
time is spent monitoring the loan and managing the loan
documents. 280
A decrease in the costs and administrative burdens associated with
monitoring should increase parties’ willingness to use asset-based loans.
High monitoring costs are a major reason why lenders avoid making assetbased loans, and the burden of continually reporting loan information is a
major reason why borrowers find the loans unattractive.
3. Structural Flexibility
In addition to being adaptable for various economic purposes
generally, in recent years, asset-based loan structures have evolved to meet
the specific circumstances of borrowers. This structural flexibility suggests
that asset-based loans can be structured to meet the specific needs of
various types of startups as well. These specific needs include financing
the purchase of equipment and providing working or growth capital.
In the 1990s, hedge funds began providing capital for asset-based loan

Lender,
SECURED
LENDER,
May
2013,
available
at
http://www.nxtbook.com/ygsreprints/CFA/p34301_tsl_may2013/index.php#/26. Berger &
Udell, supra note 16, at 319 (noting generally that software and internet-based networking
have reduced the costs of monitoring accounts receivable collateral).
278. CADENCE For ABL, BAYSIDE BUSINESS SOLUTIONS,
available at
http://baysidebiz.com/products/cadence-for-abl/.
279. Intelligent Asset-Based Lending Software, ABLSOFT, available at
http://www.ablsoft.com/documents/brochure4.pdf.
280. Lightly Monitor and Lend With Confidence, FTRANS FINANCIAL TRANSACTION
SYSTEMS,
2011,
available
at
http://www.ftrans.net/ftrans/BankSolutions/CIcollateralmonitoring/tabid/325/Default.aspx.
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transactions in the form of second lien loans when asset-based lenders
could not provide the entirety of the capital needs of borrowers.281 In such
a structure, the asset-based lender takes a senior lien on all of a company’s
assets while the hedge fund takes a second lien. 282 The second lien
provider does not take any equity and has the same strict covenants as
ordinary cash-flow loans. 283 Borrowers increasingly found second-lien
loans attractive compared to mezzanine and high-yield debt for numerous
reasons. 284 Second-lien loans were generally priced lower than unsecured
mezzanine debt, not packaged with equity components that would require
borrowers to dilute their equity or give up control in their company, and

281. Steven Migliero, Recent Trends in Asset-Based Lending — Understanding the
History
of
ABL
Can
Reap
Benefits,
ABF
J.,
Sept.
2012,
http://www.abfjournal.com/articles/recent-trends-in-asset-based-lending-understanding-thehistory-of-abl-can-reap-benefits/ [hereinafter Migliero]. A second lien loan is a loan that is
secured by a borrower’s assets but has a subordinate position with respect to the collateral
relative to the original, first lien secured lender. George H. Singer, The Lender’s Guide to
Second-Lien
Financing,
BANKING
L.
J.
(2008),
at
199-201
,
http://www.lindquist.com/files/Publication/0611cf1d-72f4-4b32-a5ec00d521026e0f/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/964a8361-687c-47a5-aa660726c43fe20c/The%20Lenders%20Guide%20to%20Second%20Lien%20Financing.pdf;
Neil Cummings & Kirk A. Davenport, A Primer on Second Lien Term Loan Financings,
COMMERCIAL
LENDING
REVIEW,
Sept-Oct
2004,
available
at
http://www.lw.com/upload/pubContent/_pdf/pub1066_1.pdf.
282. Migliero, supra note 281. See also How to Finance a Gap (‘Airball’) In An Asset
Based
Loan,
SC
CREDIT
ADVISORS,
at
7,
http://www.stonecarlie.com/content_uploads/HowtoFinanceaGapinanAssetBasedLoan.pdf.
An important aspect of second-lien lending is the contractual and legal relationship between
multiple creditors secured by the same collateral. Second-lien lenders usually must first
obtain an agreement from first-lien holders to subordinate at least some of their rights in the
common collateral and common borrower. The first-lien lender will seek to have its rights
and remedies against the second-lien lender as free and clear as possible and also control the
common collateral and the actions of the second-lien lender with respect to the common
collateral and borrower. All things being equal, a second-lien lender will seek to preserve
its own control over the common collateral and borrower and hence its likelihood of being
repaid in the event of default or bankruptcy. The agreement between the first-lien and
second-lien holders is made in an intercreditor (or subordination) agreement that specifies
the effect of a default or bankruptcy with respect to payment and lien priority. Intercreditor
agreements typically do not block payments to second-lien lenders and impose relatively
short standstill periods post default, after which the second-lien holder can exercise its
remedies against the borrower or the collateral. Intercreditor agreements are subject to legal
uncertainty, however, in part because the jurisprudence surrounding the details of such
agreements is not highly developed, and unsecured lenders have increasingly been
attempting to secure their loans with second liens. Drawbacks of second-lien lending
relative to mezzanine loans include having more restrictive covenants and potential
volatility from utilizing floating rates.
283. Migliero, supra note 281.
284. Robert C. Rubino, Why Today’s Borrowers and Lenders are Leaning Towards
Second Liens,SECURED LENDER, May/June 2004, at 30.
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were non-amortizing until first-lien loans were paid in full. 285 First/second
lien loan structures constitute about 20 percent of the asset-based loan
market. 286
A further evolution on the first lien/second lien structure came in the
mid-2000s in the form of bifurcated deals. Bifurcated structures involve
combining an asset-based revolver with a first lien on current assets (such
as accounts receivable) with a term loan secured by long-term assets and
the enterprise value of the company. 287 This structure is more expensive
than a pure asset-based loan facility but cheaper than the first lien/second
lien structure and in the range of seven to eight percent.288 Since the
financial crisis of 2008, asset-based loan structures have returned with
bifurcated deals.289 The bifurcated structure is likely one that will continue
to be used for borrowers that need more capital than provided by an assetbased revolver alone. 290 Bifurcated structures are also cheaper than
revolving credit lines offered by banks that use a high-yield bond structure
instead of a term loan.291
A structural modification that may give comfort to lenders not
otherwise inclined to make an asset-based loan is taking equity stakes in
borrowers. Lenders can take equity positions in the companies to which
they extend credit through the use of warrants and other so-called equity
kickers. 292 Likewise, purchasing credit insurance allows asset-based
285. Merger and acquisition activities among middle market companies also fueled the
demand for nontraditional financing in the form of second-lien loans. Cassandra Mott, John
Mazey & Scott Moore, Middle Market Lending: Traits and Trends, PRACTICAL LAW
JOURNAL , Nov. 2010, at 63.
286. Migliero, supra note 281.
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. See also Crumbaugh, supra note 167 (explaining that “you are going to find more
and more deals where certain classes of lenders who can’t do revolvers are going to do a
cash flow term loan coupled with an [asset-based loan] revolver from an ABL lender with a
split collateral intercreditor agreement between the two of them.”).
291. Crumbaugh, supra note 167
292. There are four main types of equity kickers. Warrants are option-like rights
enabling the holder to purchase the borrower’s stock at a price that is prespecified and, if the
stock is publicly traded, are typically 15 percent above the current market price when the
warrants are issued. The use of warrants gives an incentive for an asset-based lending fund
to offer asset-based loans at lower prices than traditional asset-based lenders that do not use
equity kickers because the fund’s interest in the overall health of the borrower mitigates
their interest in charging a high rate of interest. A second type of equity kicker is debt that
is convertible to common stock (convertible debt) and is usually subordinated to senior debt.
Converting the debt to common stock is an option of the lender; to exercise the option the
lender will typically have to pay a premium of 20 to 30 percent above the price of the
common stock when the loan was originally made. The option is hence more valuable the
higher the stock has risen since credit was extended and thereby gives an incentive for the
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lenders to feel more comfort in the loan and potentially extend credit on
terms they would not have otherwise. 293
4. Asset-Based IP Financing
Tech startups with IP assets may fail to appreciate the willingness of
lenders to use IP in an asset-based loan and therefore miss out on an
important source of capital. Asset-based loans backed by, or involved
with, IP are beginning to grow. IP is increasingly being used to secure
loans generally. 294 In particular, bifurcated asset-based loan structures with
IP in a (second lien) borrowing base are increasingly common. 295 Venture
lenders are taking a larger role in lending against IP with low or uncertain
value, as opposed to well-established brands and other assets, 296 which
indicates that asset-based lenders will increasingly do so as well. Startups
with IP also have a greater ability to attract equity capital,297 which
indicates that the value investors find in IP may be financed with debt as
well. In addition, startups with patent assets are more likely to use venture
debt financing, 298 which indicates that asset-based loans may be particularly

lender to monitor, control, or work with the borrower in order to enhance the value of the
company overall. A third, and perhaps the most straightforward type of equity kicker, is the
issuance of low-priced common stock to the lender, which allows it to share in any equity
gains while retaining minimal downside exposure. Peter K. Nevitt & Frank J. Fabozzi,
Types of Capital and Debt, in PROJECT FINANCING 59 (7th ed. 2000).
293. Lee Spurrier, Asset-Based Lenders Employ New Tool to Increase Lending Volumes
While Lowering Risk, SECURED LENDER, June 2013 at 27-28, available at,
http://www.nxtbook.com/ygsreprints/CFA/TSL_Jun2013/index.php#/38.
294. IP Investor, supra note 239; Loumioti, supra note 230 (“I find that twenty-one
percent of U.S.-originated secured syndicated loans during 1996-2005 have been
collateralized by intangibles, with intangible asset collateralization significantly increasing
over this time period”) (emphasis added).
295. Done Deal: Junior Capital’s Role in Debt Financing, supra note 249, at 12
(“Sometimes other assets will be added into the second lien borrowing base, including IP,
which never would have happened years ago.”) (emphasis added); Thomson Media, ABL
MM Lenders look to IP Collateral for Second Lien Loans, BANK LOAN REPORT, February
14, 2005, at 20, available at http://www.pullmanbonds.com/BankReport.pdf [hereinafter
Thomas Media]; Neumyer, supra note 231, at 44 (“As the economy has shifted away from
manufacturing, there has been an increase in the quantity of IP [asset-based lending]
transactions.”).
296. IP Investor, supra note 239. Venture lenders will often purchase the IP assets and
then lease them back to the borrower. Id.
297. Carolin Häussler, Dietmar Harhoff, & Elisabeth Müller, To Be Financed or Not. . .
- The Role of Patents for Venture Capital-Financing,(Ctr. for European Econ. Research,
Discussion Paper No. 09-003, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1393725;
Annamaria Conti, Jerry G. Thursby & Marie C. Thursby, Patents as Signals for Startup
Financing, 61 J. INDUSTRIAL ECON. 592 (2013).
298. Timo Fischer & Gaetan de Rassenfosse, Venture Debt Financing: Determinants of
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amenable for financing patents.
For lenders, a benefit of using IP in a borrowing base is that its value
is not directly tied to the stock market or broader economic cycles.299
Second lien asset-based loans backed by IP also offer higher returns and
thereby attract investors willing to take on higher risks, including hedge
funds. 300 For borrowers, using IP to secure loans can significantly increase
the amount of credit available. 301
In addition, over time lenders will likely reduce their aversion to IPbacked loans because they perform no worse than traditional secured
loans. 302 There also is likely more room for IP to be used as collateral
because practitioner expertise has room to grow. According to attorney
Daniel Kegan, “[e]ven within the United States, even limited to intra-state
transactions, securing intellectual property collateral is often forgotten,
while both securing and collecting intellectual property are often
misunderstood, and misapplied.” 303
Commercial law scholar Anjanette Raymond makes a similar point,
stating that:
Perhaps the most significant fact for all . . . practitioners is that
most lenders do not understand intellectual property at all. They
have difficulty understanding its value as collateral, find it hard to
gauge its worth, and have no idea how to maintain its value when
used as collateral in a finance device. 304

the Lending Decision, (TUM School of Management, Working Paper 2012), at 14, available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1909602. But see Paroma Sanyal & Catherine L. Mann, The
Financial Structure of Startup Firms: The Role of Assets, Information, and Entrepreneur
Characteristics, (Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, Working Paper No. 10-17, at 19,
available at http://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/55565/1/642984506.pdf (“[S]tartups
with intellectual property are more likely to use external debt compared to the owners’
personal resources. For hi-tech startups, patents may signal a future revenue stream that can
help to secure external loans”).
299. Thomson Media, supra note 295.
300. Id.
301. Loumioti, supra note 230.
302. Id.
303. Daniel Kegan, Securing and Collecting Intellectual Property Collateral, 52
COMM.,
BANKING
&
BANKRUPTCY
LAW,
Dec.
2007,
available
at
http://www.keganlaw.com/keganlaw-elan/Clipper_files/16-Securing%20IPIsbaCbbDec07%E2%88%9A.pdf.
304. Anjanette H. Raymond, The Use of Intellectual Property as Collateral in Secured
Financings: Practical Concerns, 32 COMPARATIVE LAW YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL
BUSINESS,
2010,
at
1-2,
available
at
https://qmro.qmul.ac.uk/xmlui/bitstream/handle/123456789/1221/RAYMONDTheUse2010
FINAL.pdf?sequence=2.

SHADAB_FINAL (ARTICLE 3) - HBS EDITS 9-4.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1136

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

9/5/2014 11:53 AM

[Vol. 16.4

Better IP valuation methods, the growth of nonbank lenders that
specialize in lending against IP (and other nontraditional collateral), and the
market’s growing comfort with using IP to secure loans 305 all indicate that
there exist overlooked opportunities for startups that own IP.
5. The Role of Hedge Funds
Over the past decade, hedge funds and other non-bank asset-based
lenders have grown to meet borrowers’ demand for capital. The growth of
non-bank lenders like hedge funds is significant because it is these lenders
that will likely be the ones to make loans to startups, either alone or as part
of a broader loan syndicate. Compared to hedge funds, traditional banks
tend to be more conservative, lack the capacity for intense collateral
monitoring, and require compliance with financial ratios that startups
typically cannot meet. By contrast, hedge funds and other non-bank
lenders have a higher tolerance for risk and are not subject to the same
regulatory constraints as banks. 306 Indeed, the financial crisis led to a longterm reduction in the credit available from banks due to banks adopting
higher lending standards and being subject to more strict capital
regulation. 307
Shortly after the turn of the century, hedge funds began to steadily
increase their loan origination activities and did so through asset-based
lending. According to HedgeFund.net, the total amount of assets managed
by asset-based lending hedge funds grew rapidly, from under $1 billion in
2003 to $16 billion in 2008. 308 Hedge funds may make direct asset-based
loans to borrowers as a borrower’s primary lender or play a role in a first
lien/second lien or bifurcated structure. Asset-based lending funds have
enabled tradtional asset-based lenders to make larger loans and the overall
asset-based industry to grow. 309
Two unique aspects of asset-based lending hedge funds indicate that

305. Thomson Media, supra note 295.
306. See Kenneth H. Marks, Four Places to Find Capital, FINANCIAL PLANNING ASS’N.,
May/June 2010, http://www.myarticlearchive.com/articles/10/026.htm; Eden, supra note 16
(discussing the importance of asset based lenders in the current marketplace); Slee, supra
note 146, at 315 (“Since [asset-based lenders] are not regulated, they have more autonomy
to structure deals.”).
307. See Mark V. Nuccio & Richard R. Loewy, Basel III: Impact on Asset-Based
Lending, ROPES & GRAY, Jan./Feb. 2013.
308. Peter Laurelli, Strategy Focus Report: Asset Based Lending Funds, April 1,
HEDGEFUND.NET,
Apr.
1,
2009,
available
at
http://www.herrick.com/siteFiles/News/ED7DE95AD77C1B98BDD5097B225845B2.pdf.
309. See Strek, infra note 316 (discussing the importance of the flexible nature of hedge
funds in growing the financing market).
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growth in the funds create new opportunities for startups to receive more
asset-based loans. First, asset-based lending funds are generally willing to
accept a wider range of collateral against which to extend credit.
Traditional asset-based lenders typically secure their loans using accounts
receivable, inventory, and equipment or other fixed assets. Asset-based
lending funds, by contrast, are more willing to use nontraditional forms of
collateral in a borrowing base, 310 including franchise loans, real estate, life
insurance, energy receivables, litigation receivables, municipal receivables,
film-related income and distribution rights, education assets, and medical
equipment. 311 For example, an owner of workers compensation receivables
was able to use the receivables to secure a loan from an asset-based lending
fund, whereas traditional asset-based lenders were not willing to advance
funds against such assets. 312 In 2011, a maker of augmented reality glasses
used its 47 patents as collateral for a $500,000 loan from a hedge fund. 313
Consistent with asset-based lending funds’ acceptance of a wider
range of collateral is a study that hedge fund lenders generally make loans
to companies having lower profitability, lower creditworthiness, and higher
asymmetric information than companies that raise debt from bank loans. 314
Hedge funds are also more willing than banks to make loans to smaller
companies, such as those with less than $50 million in income. 315
Second, asset-based lending funds are more likely to use a wider and
more borrower-friendly range of structures in their asset-based lending
transactions. Fast-growing startups, for example, may prefer an interestonly, back-ended loan in which the principal is not owed until maturity,
and asset-based lending hedge funds are more likely to make such loans
310. Warren H. Feder, Hedge Funds Fill the Void with a Flexible, Non-Traditional
Approach, 3 ABF J., July-Aug. 2005 [hereinafter Feder] (discussing the flexible nature of
hedge funds).
311. See id. (showing specific examples of non-traditional collateral); Chris O’Leary,
Asset-based Lending Funds Seize on Demand for Credit, INST’L INVESTOR, Oct. 29, 2009,
available
at
http://www.institutionalinvestor.com/Popups/PrintArticle.aspx?ArticleID=2327050
(discussing how asset-based lending funds have filled voids in the lending market and
profited as a result).
312. Feder, supra note 310. This is in part due to the fact that traditional asset-based
lenders are more likely to have restrictions limiting their eligible accounts receivable to
those that extend up to 120 or 150 days, whereas hedge funds do not. Id.
313. Dugan, supra note 19.
314. Vikas Agarwal & Costanza Meneghetti, The Role of Hedge Funds as Primary
Lenders,
REV.
DERIVATIVES
RES.
(forthcoming),
available
at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1596830.
315. Nick Mann, The Revival of Asset-Based Lending, BRIGHTON ASSOCIATES (May 31,
2012),
http://www.brightonhouseassociates.com/web/the-revival-of-asset-based-lending/
(discussing changes in financial markets that have led to different targeted investments by
hedge funds).
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available. In addition, asset-based lending funds are more willing to make
second-lien loans than are traditional asset-based lenders. 316
The use of second-lien loans was historically a very limited type of
financing utilized by companies to provide temporary (bridge) capital or
pay down existing debt in restructuring and “rescue financing” situations.317
Beginning in 2003, however, the second-lien loan market was transformed,
primarily by asset-based lending hedge funds, to be used for more general
financing needs and across a variety of transactions. The amount of
second-lien loans outstanding surged from $630 million in 2002 to over
$28 billion in 2006. 318 Data by Credit Suisse Group found that hedge funds
in 2006 purchased approximately 60 to 80 percent of second-lien loans. 319
Importantly, asset-based lending funds are also often particularly interested
in second liens secured with collateral in the form of intellectual property
because of its higher yield. 320

316. Hedge fund lenders found second-lien loans attractive because they gave their
holders high yields relative to first-lien financing, the ability to recover against collateral,
and protective rights in bankruptcy liquidation and restructuring situations. Second-lien
loans are also a type of investment that provides investors with the attractive features of
asset-based lending fund investing: equity-like returns with the risk-mitigating benefits of
lending against collateral, having operational controls, and protections through covenants
and other contractual provisions. See John O. Strek, Hedge Funds Provide Liquidity to
Healthy, Distressed Markets Primary Fund Source in Second-Lien Market, J. CORP.
RENEWAL (Dec. 2005) [hereinafter Strek] (discussing the extra protections that hedge funds
can
obtain
in
asset-based
lending),
http://www.turnaround.org/Publications/Articles.aspx?objectID=5437. When asset-based
lending hedge funds extend second-lien loans, they typically do not actively monitor
collateral as intensively as traditional first-lien asset-based lenders, and instead rely on the
senior secured lender to do so. In this respect asset-based loan funds may be free-riding on
the monitoring efforts of first-lien lenders, thereby constituting secondary members of
information-sharing coalitions, as conceptualized by Leland and Pyle. See Hayne E. Leland
& David H. Pyle, Informational Asymmetries, Financial Structure, and Financial
Intermediation, 32 J. FIN. 371, 371-72 (1977) (discussing the role of asymmetric
information signaling in providing secondary market participants the information to invest).
In addition, as second lien lenders and nonprimary monitors, asset-based lending funds are
acting consistent with Park’s theory that postulates that senior (first liens) are the efficient
monitors. See Park, supra note 37.
317. See George H. Singer, The Lender’s Guide to Second-Lien Financing, BANKING
LAW J., March 2008, at 199, 200-01 (discussing the traditional applications of second-lien
lenders).
318. Thomas C. Carlson, Rights Offerings Provide “New” Solution to Classic Leverage
Problem, J. CORP. RENEWAL, June 2007.
319. Harris Rubinroit, Georgia-Pacific Takeover Sets Record Year for Second-Lien
Loans, BLOOMBERG , Nov. 13, 2006.
320. Thomson Media, supra note 295 (discussing the use of IP as collateral in loans).
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C. Limitations and Asset-Based Lender Opportunism
Despite the potential benefits of asset-based loans to borrowers, the
loans may directly or indirectly result in creditor opportunism in three
ways. First, asset-based loans are structured so as to be overcollateralized
since the loan is always less than the value of the asset. This means that
asset-based lenders are generally less concerned about the overall health of
the company than a typical financial statement lender. Indeed, by lending
against assets for less than they are worth if sold, an asset-based lender
seeking earlier repayment of their loan would rather have the debtor default
on their loans so they can seize and sell the assets in a liquidation. Other
characteristics of asset-based loans that may make default attractive to a
lender is that lenders may earn fees upon a covenant breach and borrowers
Because of the
may have to pay an early-payment fee. 321
overcollateralization and fees, asset-based lenders may be less willing than
financial statement lenders to renegotiate a loan if there is a covenant
breach. These incentives may be exacerbated by a perverse incentive
created by asset-based loans. A borrower that is desperate for cash may
seek to increase the size of its credit line by accumulating inventory (or
otherwise growing its borrowing base) instead of actually earning cash
from its customers. 322
Second, the specific ways in which borrowing base provisions are
drafted may enable lenders to engage in opportunistic conduct. Contracts
that give lenders too much discretion to value the assets in a borrowing
base, or what assets are eligible in the first place, give lenders an incentive
to “low ball” the valuation to help assure themselves of repayment later.
Third parties that perform valuation services may also be paid or otherwise
captured by lenders, and therefore have a bias towards the lenders’
interests. In addition, a borrowing base provision that permits lenders to
unilaterally decrease the amount of credit available by decreasing the
advance rate or increasing reserve requirements 323 may effectively allow
the lender to foreclose on the loan by cutting needed working capital from
the borrower — even though the borrower is in perfect financial health.

321. See Dugan, supra note 19 (discussing ways in which hedge fund asset-based
lenders are filling a demand for loans stemming from a lack of traditional financing
sources).
322. Ted Hurlbut, The Dangers of Asset Based Loans for Small and Independent
Retailers, HURLBUT & ASSOCIATES, Feb. 3, 2009, http://www.hurlbutassociates.com/retailperspectives-blog/bid/50787/The-Dangers-of-Asset-Based-Loans-For-Small-andIndependent-Retailers (discussing pitfalls for retailers when using asset-based loans).
323. See generally Universal Stainless and Alloy Products, Inc. Credit Agreement,
supra note 192 (showing an example of an asset-based deal putting in such conditions).
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Third, distressed borrowers may be particularly vulnerable to creditor
opportunism. In general, when a company is in distress, its assets may be
more valuable than its broad enterprise value. This discrepancy gives
lenders an incentive to sell a company’s loans at a discount to buyers that
are more interested in owning the collateral than investing in the
company. 324 Moreover, to the extent second lien loans are used as part of
or to enable an asset-based loan package, they may facilitate certain types
of creditor opportunism both before and during the bankruptcy process.
One type of opportunism is known as a “loan to own” strategy which
consists of a lender providing financing to a troubled firm at a high interest
rate to increase the probability of default and then exchange the debt
positions for equity in a restructuring, thereby gaining ownership of the
firm. 325 In particular, providing second lien loans may afford a hedge fund
an opportunity to ultimately control a struggling firm. According to Strek,
the second-lien market has also become a method for hedge funds
to gain control of companies that default on their financings.
Some of these loans may have an equity conversion feature in an
instance of financial distress. Hedge funds are very comfortable
becoming owners of companies through such “loan-to-own”
strategies. The basic strategy is for a hedge fund to provide
financing to a struggling company at attractive rates for the fund.
If the company cannot subsequently service the debt obligations,
the fund converts its debt position into a significant/majority
equity position. 326
In addition, when a borrower does go into bankruptcy, the presence of
second lien lenders may create impediments to reorganization by limiting
assets to secure financing in bankruptcy and general reorganization

324. Eric Uhlfelder, Asset-Based Lending Shifts to Owning, INST’L INVESTOR, July 2010,
http://www.institutionalinvestor.com/Popups/PrintArticle.aspx?ArticleID=2628221
(reporting that “instead of originating [asset-based] loans, the fund could do better buying
secondary loans at deep discounts from distressed owners . . . [because] income streams
could be unleashed once the assets were divorced from the troubled institutions”).
325. See Michelle M. Harner, Activist Distressed Debtholders, 89 WASH. U. L. REV.
155, 164-170 (2011) (discussing loan-to-own strategies); Adam Pincus, Shining a Light on
Loan-to-Own,
THE
REAL
DEAL
(April
1,
2009),
http://therealdeal.com/issues_articles/shining-a-light-on-loan-to-own/
(discussing
the
increased risks of loan-to-own); Danielle Fugazy, Lender Rebirth?, MERGERS &
ACQUISITIONS, April 9, 2009, http://www.themiddlemarket.com/maj/2009_5/-192060-1.html
(loan-to-own “opportunities involve buying debt of distressed companies, and then
swapping those positions for equity in the restructured entity.”).
326. Strek, supra note 316.
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options. 327 Hedge funds in particular may disrupt the reorganization
process by causing collective action problems or having conflicts of
interest with the debtor or other creditors.328
CONCLUSION
This Article has shown that performance sensitivity is an important
and unique characteristic of financial contracts. Commercial loans in
particular can be performance sensitive in several ways. This Article
focuses on performance pricing, borrowing base provisions, and
renegotiation as the most important mechanisms of performance sensitive
loans. Performance sensitivity is a type of creditor governance mechanism
that protects creditors against losses resulting from the agency costs of
debt. Performance sensitivity is also related to traditional governance
mechanisms in the form of monitoring, collateralization, and covenants.
As predicted by incomplete contracting theory, performance sensitive debt
is generally more efficient than debt that lacks any responsiveness to a
borrower’s creditworthiness. In addition, performance sensitive debt helps
to flesh out existing theories and empirical findings of corporate capital
structure. Focusing on performance sensitivity as a separate governance
mechanism may also increase the efficiency of corporate credit markets by
causing practitioners to implement better or new types of performance
sensitive provisions. My analysis suggests that increased performance
sensitivity has the potential to improve markets for financial instruments
that typically are not performance sensitive, such as bonds.
Asset-based lending in particular is an important and underappreciated
type of performance sensitive debt. Asset-based loans adjust the credit
available to a borrower using the unique borrowing base provision. The
loans are often the only type available for high risk borrowers, and
therefore employ robust governance in the form of strong monitoring,
collateralization, and two forms of performance sensitivity (performance
pricing and borrowing base revolvers). Because asset-based loans can be
structured to meet the needs of a wide variety of borrowers, they likely can
be expanded to provide financing to certain startups. The types of startups
most likely to benefit from asset-based loans are revenue-stage angelbacked or venture-backed startups that have qualifying assets and are

327. See generally Gordon L. Su, Bankruptcy Implications of Second Lien Loans
(Working
Paper),
http://www.turnaround.org/cmaextras/Paper—
BankruptcyImplications.pdf (discussing the impact on bankruptcy recoveries caused by
second-lien loans).
328. See id. at 21-25 (discussing the interference second-lien holders create in
bankruptcy proceedings).
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seeking financing for growth or working capital. Asset-based lending has
grown and evolved in the last few decades and will likely continue to do so
and become a more mainstream financing option.
Despite its general efficiency and ability to make credit available to
borrowers with nowhere else to turn, asset-based lending is not immune
from problems of creditor opportunism. Indeed, because asset-based loans
are overcollateralized, they may give lenders too much discretion and are
often made to distressed borrowers. The loans may present lenders with
unique forms of opportunism and weak incentives to work with borrowers
to restructure loans. While certain startups are likely to benefit from
making greater use of asset-based loans, failure to take into account the
loans’ potential dangers and incentive misalignments may put the
borrower’s enterprise in jeopardy.

